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Abstract 
I examine the long-term valuation consequence of over-investment in mergers and 
acquisitions (M&As) on acquiring firms through the “anticipation effect,” in which 
forward-looking prices embed investors’ expectations about the profitability of firms’ 
future acquisitions. Using a sample of 1,451 firms with past acquisition activities, I find 
that their market valuations depend on both the profitability of their past acquisitions 
and their current free cash flow. Specifically, among firms with positive free cash flow, 
those with the worst history of value-destroying acquisitions experience lower market 
valuations. Among firms with negative free cash flow, the history of value-destroying 
acquisitions is not systematically associated with firm value. A significant portion of the 
discount is from a lower valuation of cash holdings. These findings are consistent with 
investors forming expectations about the profitability of future possible acquisitions 
based on the performance outcomes of firms’ past acquisitions and value these firms 
accordingly based on the likelihood of engaging in future acquisitions. They also 
provide empirical support for using observed market prices to proxy for investors’ 
expectations about firms’ future investment opportunities. 
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1. Introduction  
Stock prices depend on investors’ expectations about firms’ future cash flows. As cash 
flows are generated by investments, it follows that investors’ expectations about firms’ 
future investment strategies would play a significant role in affecting stock prices. 
Indeed, researchers often use firm value as a proxy for investment opportunities (e.g., 
Lang et al. (1991), Pastor and Veronesi (2003)). The underlying assumption is that stock 
price embeds investors’ expectations about firms’ future investment strategies. This 
paper provides empirical evidence on this assumption, examining the long-term 
valuation consequences of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) for acquiring firms. 
Specifically, I examine whether stock market valuations embed an anticipation discount 
for acquiring firms that have engaged in value-destroying acquisitions. The idea is that 
past value-destroying acquisitions lower investors’ expectations about the profitability 
of these firms’ future investments through an “anticipation effect,” in which forward-
looking firm values contain information about possible upcoming investments in M&As.  
This investigation can also be motivated by anecdotal references in the financial 
press about the valuation consequences of firms’ past M&A activities. For instance, 
commenting on Hewlett-Packard’s recent low stock price but strong forecasted earnings 
and growth rate, an analyst at Seeking Alpha wrote, “Companies like Hewlett-Packard 
(HPQ) may not be good investments for value investors since these companies will 
continue to pay high valuations for acquisitions.”1 An implicit assumption underlying 
this statement is that a firm’s past investment history is informative about its future 
                                                          
1  See the full text from Seeking alpha at http://seekingalpha.com/article/262738-glenview-capital-loves-
expedia-and-these-13-super-stocks.  
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investments. Meanwhile, prior academic research also finds that CEOs play a significant 
role in investment decisions (Malmendier and Tate (2008)), and that the average CEO 
tenure is around eight to nine years (Kaplan and Minton (2012)). In addition, it is also 
possible that managers learn from prior value-destroying acquisitions and in the future 
invest in value-enhancing acquisitions. To the extent that new CEOs may adopt 
investment strategies substantially different from those adopted by previous CEOs, or to 
the extent that managers may learn from their own past investments, it is an empirical 
question whether and when a firm’s past investment history would affect investors’ 
pricing of its future firm value.  
I study the valuation implication of investors’ expectations about firms’ future 
investment strategies in the context of mergers and acquisitions for several reasons. First, 
mergers and acquisitions are among firms’ largest capital expenditures. Other 
investments, including R&D expenditures and purchases of fixed assets, are smaller in 
magnitude. 2  Given the large size of M&A deals, it is important to understand the 
economic consequence of M&As not only in the short run but also in the long run. 
Second, unlike R&D or purchase of fixed assets, M&As are discrete investment activities. 
As documented by Harford and Li (2007), investment through acquisitions is the most 
readily observed form of corporate empire-building. Existing research (e.g., Rau and 
Vermaelen (1998) and Bouwman et al. (2009)) has shown that many M&As result in 
                                                          
2 The mean values of M&A transaction value and the cash portion of the transaction value in my sample are 
$480 million and $326 million, respectively. The Compustat mean values of capital expenditure and R&D 
over the same period are $125 million and $63 million, respectively. 
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bidders’ post-acquisition stock market underperformance that partially stems from over-
investment due to an agency problem. M&As thus provide a powerful and 
representative setting for me to examine the economic consequence of firms’ investment 
strategies. Third, commercially available databases provide exact M&A transaction 
details including event dates and transaction values. This allows me to evaluate the 
outcome of an acquisition after its completion and then use that evaluation as a proxy 
for future anticipated investment outcomes.   
In this paper, I examine the hypothesis that investors form expectations about the 
profitability of firms’ future M&A investment decisions based on the performance 
outcomes of past acquisitions and value these firms accordingly based on the likelihood 
these firms will make future acquisitions. I measure the outcome of an acquisition using 
the one-year abnormal stock return starting from the completion date of the acquisition. 
I classify acquisitions with positive one-year post-acquisition abnormal returns as value-
enhancing acquisitions and acquisitions with negative one-year post-acquisition 
abnormal returns as value-destroying acquisitions. I use the firms’ free cash flow as a 
proxy for investors’ expectations about the likelihood of future M&As. In particular, I 
designate firms as likely acquirers if they have positive free cash flow and as unlikely 
acquirers if they have negative free cash flow. This designation is motivated by the 
agency theory that firms tend to overinvest in negative NPV projects when they have 
positive free cash flow (Jensen (1986)) and empirical findings by Richardson (2006). In 
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particular, Richardson finds that firms with positive free cash flow tend to invest beyond 
the predicted levels. 
I find that the market valuations of firms with prior M&A activities depend on 
both whether their past M&As are value-destroying or value-enhancing and whether the 
firms have positive free cash flow. When firms have positive free cash flow (suggesting 
that they have the financial means to engage in future M&As), their valuations are lower 
if more of their past M&As are value-destroying. On average, among firms with positive 
free cash flow, those with the worst history of value-destroying M&As experience a 
reduction of 10% in firm value as measured by Tobin’s Q, consistent with investors 
pricing potential future value-destroying acquisitions. 3 In contrast, among firms with 
negative free cash flow, the profitability of past M&As has no significant impact on 
current market valuations, consistent with the idea that investors assign a low 
probability to future acquisition activities. These findings are robust to alternative 
measures of firm value, and to alternative measures of M&A performance.  
I also find that a significant portion of the discount is from discounted valuations 
of cash holdings. Among firms with positive free cash flow, each additional dollar of 
cash holdings at firms with the worst history of value-destroying M&As, on average, is 
valued 87 cents less than firms whose past M&As have been most value-enhancing (i.e., 
more of their M&As are followed by positive abnormal returns in the year after 
acquisition completion). This finding is consistent with investors’ view that cash will be 
                                                          
3  Throughout this paper, I use “history of value-destroying M&As” and “history of over-investment” 
interchangeably.  
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invested sub-optimally, especially when firms have already made more value-
destroying M&As.  
To further establish that the discount in firm value is related to investors’ 
anticipation of future investments, I examine whether the discount is associated with 
investor uncertainty about future earnings. I find for firms with positive free cash flow, 
information uncertainty, proxied by analyst forecast dispersion, is positively associated 
with the past history of over-investment, consistent with information uncertainty, at 
least partially, contributing to low firm valuations.  
An assumption in my analysis is that investors assess a lower likelihood of future 
M&A for firms with negative free cash flow. An implication is that when firms with 
negative free cash flow actually announce M&As, the announcements are more likely to 
be “news” to investors. Consistent with this prediction, I find a significantly higher stock 
price reaction for acquisition plans made by firms with negative free cash flow. The 
average 5-day abnormal return around the announcement windows is 0.012 for the 
negative free cash flow sample and -0.002 for the positive free cash flow sample. Further, 
for firms with negative free cash flow, the announcement return is negatively associated 
with past over-investment history, consistent with investors forming expectations about 
announced acquisitions based on historical realized M&A performance at the time of 
acquisition announcements.    
This paper contributes to the literature by studying the long-term valuation 
consequences of acquiring firms’ past M&A activities through the anticipation effect. 
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Unlike prior literature that focuses on evaluating whether the merger and acquisition 
transactions themselves create or destroy values, I emphasize the anticipation effect, a 
channel through which past M&As affect investors’ expectations about future 
investments. The findings in this paper have several implications. First, empirical 
studies often use firm value (e.g., Tobin’s Q) as a proxy for firms’ investment 
opportunities (e.g., Lang et al. (1991)). The underlying assumption is that stock prices 
embed expectations about future investment decisions. My findings provide evidence 
that validates this assumption. In particular, I argue that the forward-looking firm value 
contains information about the anticipated M&As, as well as their anticipated 
performance.  
Second, this research adds capital market consequence to findings in Richardson 
(2006). Richardson documents that firms are more likely to invest more than expected 
when they have positive free cash flow. By studying mergers and acquisitions, a specific 
type of investment, I show that when firms’ investment levels are likely to be higher 
than predicted, investors have typically reacted to this expected increase in investment 
level according to firms’ investment history.  
Third, my findings shed light on the underlying mechanism for takeovers to 
function in a disciplinary role. Mitchell and Lehn (1990) find that firms that made value-
destroying acquisitions (“bad bidders”) are more likely to be acquired by other firms as 
outsiders tend to correct the agency problem manifested in previous bad acquisitions. 
Their findings suggest that takeovers are both a “symptom” and a “solution” in that 
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firms that make value-destroying M&As exhibit symptoms of over-investment, and the 
over-investment problems get corrected later when these firms are acquired. The link 
through which the symptom and the solution are connected, however, is not discussed. 
My findings shed light on this link. I find that bad bidders experience low firm values in 
the future when they have positive free cash flow. Thus, the combination of positive free 
cash flow and low firm value attracts potential buyers to take over the bad bidder in the 
future. I find that firms with positive free cash flow and histories of value-destroying 
acquisitions are more likely to be acquired in the future. 
This paper extends recent research on the valuation effects of investors’ 
anticipation of pending acquisitions on target firms (Song and Walkling (2000) 4, Cremers 
et al. (2008), Edmans et al. (2012)). Cremers et al. (2008) consider the impact of takeover 
likelihood on target firms’ valuation.5 They hypothesize and show that firms exposed to 
takeovers have different returns than protected firms, and a trading strategy of going 
long (short) firms with high (low) takeover likelihoods creates significant abnormal 
returns. Edmans et al. (2012) examine target valuation and argue that the observed 
valuation is the combination of two effects: (1) the trigger effect - a decrease in stock 
price that invites a takeover attempt; and, (2) the anticipation effect - an increase in stock 
price due to increased takeover probability. My study differs from theirs in that I focus 
on the anticipation effect for the acquiring firms. This design has several implications 
                                                          
4 For example, Song and Walkling (2000) develop and test the “Acquisition Probability Hypothesis.” They show 
that rivals of initial acquisition targets earn abnormal returns due to the increased probability that they will 
be targets themselves.  
5 They term takeover likelihood as “takeover vulnerability”. 
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beyond studies on target firms. Specifically, I provide direct evidence on the 
consequences of firms’ investment strategies. In contrast, the anticipation effect for a 
target firm may come from various sources (e.g., gains from strategic synergy, gains 
from disciplining target firms) and is unrelated to target firms’ investment strategies. In 
addition, the mechanism of how anticipation works differs for acquiring firms versus 
target firms. Also unlike Cai et al. (2011) who define anticipated acquirers as later 
bidders in an industry merger wave, my research motivates the anticipation effect for 
acquiring firms from agency theory and examines how future firm values are related to 
inferences from past acquisitions based on the anticipated likelihood of future 
acquisitions. In other words, I do not study the performance consequences of 
acquisitions per se; rather, I study the valuation consequences of investors’ (revised) 
expectations about future investments chosen by acquiring firms themselves.  
Lastly, this paper adds evidence to the literature examining the value of 
corporate cash holdings. I document that the anticipated outcome of cash investment 
measured using realized investment outcomes is directly related to investors’ valuation 
of cash holdings. Analytical models predict that cash assets are prone to the risk that 
managers direct corporate resources to their own benefits (Myers and Majluf (1984) and 
Myers and Rajan (1998)). My findings complement their studies by showing that the 
expectation of this risk affects the valuation of cash assets.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews related 
work in this area and develops the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and sample 
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selection. Section 4 outlines the empirical design and discusses the results. Section 5 
presents several additional findings and robustness checks.  Section 6 concludes. 
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2. Related Literature and Hypothesis Development 
A large number of studies studying firm performance after mergers and 
acquisitions finds that while mergers create shareholder value in total, on average, most 
of the benefits accrue to the target firm (Rau and Vermaelen (1998), Bouwman et al. 
(2009)).  
One explanation for this long-term underperformance is the agency problem 
between managers and owners. Jensen (1986) posits that managers of firms with positive 
free cash flow will tend to invest it in wasteful (negative NPV) projects rather than 
distribute it to shareholders. Lang et al. (1991) find that if investment opportunities are 
not valued by investors (as evidenced by a low Tobin’s Q before the acquisition), the 
short-window return around the acquisition announcement is inversely related to free 
cash flow. They interpret this result as suggesting that investors believe that free cash 
flow encourages over-investment in value-destroying acquisitions. Masulis et al. (2007) 
find that firms with weak corporate governance experience low announcement returns, 
consistent with the idea that investors infer that managers in these firms are more likely 
to make wasteful acquisitions. Richardson (2006) models free cash flow and investment 
levels simultaneously.1 He estimates firms’ predicted levels of investment and shows 
that firms with positive ex ante free cash flow are more likely to invest at higher than 
predicted levels. Overall, these studies provide support for the free cash flow hypothesis.  
                                                          
1 As argued in Richardson (2006), the positive relation between observed investment and observed cash flow 
may due to the fact that cash flow is a proxy for investment opportunities (Alti (2003)). Richardson 
overcomes this by incorporating accounting-based measures of growth opportunities and simultaneously 
estimating investment and free cash flow.  
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A common thread among these previously discussed studies is that researchers 
conjecture, but do not test directly, that observed stock prices embed expectations about 
firms’ future investment decisions. For example, Lang et al. (1991) classify future M&As 
into good and bad investments based on pre-acquisition valuations of acquiring firms, 
proxied by Tobin’s Q. They, do not analyze how expectations about future M&As are 
formed. In this paper, I examine the relation between the profitability of firms’ past 
M&A investment decisions and investors’ expectations about the profitability of firms’ 
future M&A decisions as captured by Tobin’s Q. Specifically, I hypothesize that 
investors expect lower future profitability for firms with more frequent value-destroying 
M&A activities in the past and consequently assgin lower values to these firms’ stocks. 2 
Since the future profitability is conditional on future M&A activities, I expect that the 
lower valuation will be a function of the likelihood that firms engage in M&A activities 
in the future. As discussed in detail in Section 3, I proxy for the likelihood of future 
M&A activities using a measure of firms’ free cash flow (Richardson (2006)). The idea 
behind this measure is that firms with positive free cash flow are more likely to attempt 
future M&As than firms with negative free cash flow. Positive free cash flow firms can 
fund their investments without accessing external capital markets. To summarize, my 
first hypothesis in alternative form is stated as follows:  
                                                          
2 Throughout this paper, I draw inference about investors’ expectations about the profitability of possible 
future acquisitions based on the valuation difference, i.e., the difference between firms with histories of 
value-destroying acquisitions versus firms with histories of value-enhancing acquisitions.  When having 
positive free cash flow, firms with more frequent value-destroying acquisitions in the past are hypothesized 
to have lower firm value compared with firms with more frequent value-enhancing acquisitions in the past.  
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H1: Firm values are negatively associated with the incidence of past value-destroying 
M&As when firms have positive free cash flow.  
Since the anticipated over-investment problem is related to cash expenditure, a 
corollary of H1 is that the market valuation of cash will depend on investors’ 
assessments of the profitability of future M&A activities. H1 states that when a firm has 
positive free cash flow, its value decreases with a worse past investment history. If this 
relation is caused by investors’ anticipation of future investment in a value-destroying 
M&A using cash, I expect a lower valuation coefficient on the firm’s marginal cash 
holdings, as cash is more likely to be invested wastefully than to increase shareholder 
value in these firms. In other words, a low valuation on the firms’ marginal cash 
holdings reflects a discount due to investors’ expectation that management will waste 
cash on hand. In contrast, for firms with negative free cash flow, I do not expect a lower 
valuation coefficient on marginal cash, as the anticipated likelihood of over-investment 
is much lower.  
Opler et al. (1999) decompose cash holdings into an expected component and an 
excess component using firm characteristics. The expected component of cash is the 
amount needed for normal operations, while the excess component is the cash holding 
beyond what is implied by the business model. As the discount placed by investors is 
due to investors’ expectation of the manager’s rent extraction of excess cash, I 
hypothesize that the discount in the marginal value of cash holdings comes primarily 
from the excess component. Thus, my second set of hypotheses is stated as follows: 
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H2a: The marginal value of cash is negatively associated with the incidence of value-
destroying M&As for firms with positive free cash flow.  
H2b: The marginal value of excess cash is negatively associated with the incidence of 
value-destroying M&As for firms with positive free cash flow.  
Erickson et al. (2012) find that post-acquisition stock returns are inversely 
associated with changes in analyst forecast dispersion, their proxy for information 
uncertainty. They interpret this finding as indicating that information uncertainty is at 
least a contributing factor to stock price underperformance, as higher information 
uncertainty leads to a higher discount rate (the denominator effect) for the firm’s 
fundamentals (Wang (1993)). Since H1 and H2 discuss firm value in the context of 
investors’ expectation of future possible acquisitions, I further investigate whether the 
anticipation effect affects firm values through the discount rate channel. The increase in 
information uncertainty associated with M&As may come from both the probability of 
such an acquisition and the result of combining two separate business entities. To the 
extent that firms with positive free cash flow are more likely to engage in future M&As 
that would significantly alter the scope of their operations, analysts will find it difficult 
to forecast their future earnings. Firms with histories of value-destroying acquisitions 
may not carefully select their target firms, resulting in more disagreement in analyst 
forecasts. Thus, if Erickson et al.’s argument is also valid in anticipating possible 
acquisitions, information uncertainty, proxied by analyst forecast dispersion is 
positively associated with the past history of value-destroying M&As for firms with 
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positive free cash flow. In contrast, if a firm has negative free cash flow, such a relation is 
not to be expected, as the likelihood of an acquisition is much lower. Thus, my third 
hypothesis is stated as follows: 
H3: Information uncertainty, proxied by analyst forecast dispersion, is positively 
associated with the incidence of value-destroying M&As when a firm has positive free 
cash flow.  
Firms’ past M&A performance should affect current prices if firms are expected 
to conduct M&A in the future. H1 and H2 test this idea by using firms’ current free cash 
flow as a proxy for the likelihood of future acquisitions. In the next hypothesis, I 
examine whether past history affects share prices when the likelihood has materialized. 
Specifically, I examine whether investors’ response to an acquisition announcement is a 
function of firms’ M&A history.  I predict that the stock price reaction to an acquisition 
announcement will depend on the acquirers’ M&A history, when such an 
announcement is a significant surprise to investors. If an acquisition is expected and 
information about the anticipated performance implied by the past has already been 
impounded in firm value, the short-window return around the announcement should 
not be systematically related to the over-investment history. To the extent investors 
assess higher (lower) likelihood of future acquisitions for firms with positive (negative) 
free cash flow, I therefore expect a negative relation between the stock response to 
acquisition announcements and the history of value-destroying acquisitions for firms 
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with negative free cash flow, but not for firms with positive free cash flow. This 
prediction is stated in its alternative form as below:  
H4: The short-term announcement window return is negatively associated with a firm’s 
incidence of value-destroying M&As when a firm has negative free cash flow. 
 
 16 
 
3. Data and Sample Selection 
3.1 Sample 
            I obtain mergers and acquisitions data from the SDC (Securities Data Company) 
Platinum database from 1979 to 2007. Similar to Edmans et al. (2012), I remove bids 
classified as acquisitions of partial stakes, minority squeeze-outs, buybacks, 
recapitalizations, and exchange offers. Since my main research question requires stock 
price and return data on acquirers, I examine only U.S. domestic public acquirers. To 
calculate the past history of mergers and acquisitions, I consider completed transactions 
and require that the acquirer own less than 50% of the target’s shares prior to the 
acquisition announcement and more than 50% of the target’s shares after acquisition 
completion. As my main hypothesis pertains to cash investments, I calculate a firm’s 
past M&A history based on historical M&As that are at least partially cash financed, i.e., 
cash payment accounts for at least 1% of the transaction value.1 Lastly, I remove all small 
transactions with deal value less than 1 million and all acquiring firms in the financial 
(SIC code 6000-6999) and utility (SIC code 4000-4999) industries. The final SDC sample 
consists of 3,870 acquisition deals. 
 I merge the SDC sample with stock return data from CRSP and accounting data 
from Compustat. For each firm-year observation with available free cash flow measure 
                                                          
1 Consistent with Bouwman et al. (2009), around 40% of the deals are financed completely through stocks in 
my sample. I obtain very similar results if I alternatively require cash payment to be at least 5%, 10% or 20%. 
Untabulated results show, however, that firm value is not systematically associated with the past M&A 
history if I conduct the analysis using completely stock-financed deals.  This is consistent with the agency 
theory explanation of over-investment in M&A that managers tend to waste cash when they have positive 
free cash flow.  
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(FCF, defined in Section 3.2), I calculate a firm’s M&A history over a ten-year rolling 
window. In addition, to separate the performance consequence on firm values due to 
M&A themselves from the valuation effect due to anticipation about future investments, 
I examine the market valuations of acquiring firms beginning three years after their most 
recent acquisitions. To be included in the final sample, a firm-year observation must be 
at least three years past the most recent M&A completion date to ensure that the 
performance consequences from past M&As have been fully realized.2 Therefore, the 
merged sample starts from 1989 and contains 6,290 firm-year observations with 1,451 
unique firms. Among these observations, I further exclude firm-years when an 
acquisition is announced before the fiscal year ends. To ensure that results are not 
driven by investors’ pricing of a concurrent acquisition announcement, as my main 
hypotheses (H1 to H3) are about investors’ expectation and pricing of possible upcoming 
acquisitions. Together, these requirements result in a final sample of 6,218 firm-year 
observations for the main tests. The sample used to test H4 is smaller as this hypothesis 
requires a sample of firm-year observations that are actually associated with an 
acquisition announcement. The exact timeline is described in Figure 1.  
 
 
 
                                                          
2 This design choice works against finding the hypothesized results. Serial acquirers that announce M&As 
frequently, where the anticipated firm value discount is likely to be higher, are less likely to be included in 
the sample. 
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Figure 1:  The Timeline 
3.2 Main variable construction and summary statistics  
 For each firm-year observation, I calculate that firm’s past M&A performance 
over a rolling ten-year window. Specifically, to assess whether an M&A is value-
enhancing or value-destroying, I calculate one-year buy-and-hold cumulative abnormal 
returns (BHCAR) starting from the completion dates of acquisitions.3 Following Rau and 
Vermaelen (1998), I calculate abnormal returns as buy-and-hold returns adjusted by the 
Fama-French (1992, 1993) 5*5 size and book-to-market benchmark portfolios. If the 
interval between two neighboring M&As is less than a year, I collect returns since the 
last M&A’s completion date to 14 days before the next M&A in calculating BHCAR. I 
classify an acquisition as value-enhancing (value-destroying) if its one-year post-merger 
BHCAR is positive (negative).4 I then calculate the main independent variable Incidence 
as the weighted average negative performance incidence. Specifically, Incidence is 
defined as the ratio of the number of value-destroying M&As to the total number of 
M&As over the ten-year rolling window. To capture the recency effect, I weight each 
M&A by ten minus distance in time as the weight, where the distance in time is the 
                                                          
3 Bouwman et al. (2009) show that the post-acquisition long-run market return is more appropriate than the short-
window announcement return to evaluate acquisition performance. In untabulated tests, I alternatively accumulate 
returns from the announcement dates of acquisitions. Results and inference are similar to the reported in all aspects. 
4  Consistent with prior research, the mean and median of one-year BHCAR are -0.015 and -0.056, statistically 
significant from zero at 10% and 1% level, respectively.  
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number of years between the M&A and the year of interest in my main test (i.e., the year 
where I examine the firm’s valuation). 5 This weighting scheme assigns a smaller weight 
to less recent acquisitions. For instance, if a firm engaged in two acquisitions in year t-6 
and year t-4, respectively, the one in year t-6 would receive a weight of 0.4 whereas the 
other in year t-4 would receive a weight of 0.6. Since I use a ten-year rolling window, 
Incidence is firm-specific, time-varying, and bounded between 0 and 1. A higher Incidence 
(more toward to 1) indicates a worse past history.  
 Following Richardson (2006), I calculate free cash flow (FCF) as cash flow beyond 
what is necessary to maintain assets in place (including servicing existing debt 
obligations) and finance expected new investments. Specifically, I adopt the method in 
Richardson (2006) and calculate FCF as follows: 
        FCFi,t= CFAIP, i,t –I*new, i,t= CFOi,t - DAi,t + RDi,t - I*new, i, t         [1] 
where CFOi, t, DAi, t, and RDi,t are cash flow from operations, depreciation and 
amortization expense, R&D expense for firm i in year t scaled by total assets, 
respectively. Inew,* i, t is the expected new capital expenditure, estimated as the predicted 
value from estimating equation [2] below: 
 Inew, i, t = α + β1 V/P i, t-1+β2 Book Leverage i, t-1+β3 Cash i, t-1+β4 Age i, t-1+β5 Size i, t-1+β6 ∆MVE i, t-1+β7 Inew, i, t-1+ ui,t     
[2] 
                                                          
5 I also calculate Incidence as a simple average of negative performance incidence, a deal-size weighted 
average of negative performance incidence, or a simple (weighted) average of BHCAR. Results are similar to 
those reported in all aspects.  
   20 
 
Equation [2] is estimated with industry and year fixed effects over the entire sample 
with available data in Compustat. Inew, i, t in equation [2] is new capital investment, defined 
as the difference between total capital investment and investment to maintain assets in 
place for firm i in year t, deflated by total assets. Total capital investment is calculated as 
R&D expenditure plus capital expenditure plus acquisition expenditure less cash 
receipts from PPE disposal. Investment to maintain assets in place is proxied by 
depreciation and amortization expense. All variables in equation [2] are predictors of 
new capital expenditure and are defined as in Richardson (2006). Specifically, V/P is a 
measure of growth opportunities and is calculated as the ratio of the Ohlson model 
(1995) firm value (VAIP) to the market value of equity. 6 Book Leverage is measured as the 
sum of current debt and long-term debt, deflated by the sum of book value of total debt 
and book value of equity. Cash is measured as cash and short-term investments, deflated 
by total assets. Age is the log of the number of years the firm has been listed on CRSP. 
Size is the log of total assets. ∆MVE is the change in market value of the firm from the 
prior year. Inew, i, t-1 is the new capital investment in year t-1, deflated by total assets. I 
calculate FCF as in [1] for each firm-year observation in my final sample and use it as a 
partitioning variable in the main tests. 7 I hypothesize that investors perceive firms with 
positive FCF as likely acquirers because these firms have internally generated cash to 
                                                          
6 As in Richardson (2006), VAIP is estimated as (1-αr)BV+α(1+r)X-α·r·d, where α=


 r1
. ω is the abnormal 
earnings persistence parameter and takes a value of 0.62. d is annual dividends. X is operating income after 
depreciation. r is the discount rate and takes a value of 12%. 
7 Estimation results are very similar to that in Richardson (2006) and are available upon requests.  
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make acquisitions. Likewise, I hypothesize that investors perceive firms with negative 
FCF as unlikely acquirers. 
 Table 1, Panel A presents the descriptive statistics of M&A deals. The mean 
values of M&A transaction value and the cash portion of the transaction value in my 
sample are $480 million and $326 million, respectively. On average, the size of the deal 
(the cash payment portion) represents 28% (20%) of an acquirer firm’s pre-acquisition 
market capitalization. This is consistent with the notion that acquisitions are a significant 
investment in terms of both transaction size and cash expenditure.  
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Deal Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Mean P25 Median P75 Std Dev 
Deal 3,870 480.15 17.50 64.00 250.00 2,169.90 
Cash Deal 3,870 325.52 10.00 44.45 185.00 1,280.13 
MVE (Acquirer) 3,870 7,763.20 173.00 736.78 3,104.20 27,123.11 
Deal/MVE 3,870 0.28 0.03 0.10 0.29 0.64 
Cash Deal/MVE 3,870 0.20 0.02 0.07 0.19 0.54 
 
This panel reports the descriptive statistics for the M&A deals studied in this paper. Deal is total transaction 
value of the M&A deal (in millions). Cash deal is the cash payment portion of the deal (in millions). MVE is 
the acquirer’s pre-acquisition market value of equity (in millions). Deal/MVE is the relative deal size scaled 
by acquirer’s MVE. Cash deal/MVE is the relative cash payment portion scaled by acquirer’s MVE. 
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Panel B: Sample Descriptive Statistics 
    Full Sample   FCF>=0 (Positive FCF=1)   FCF<0 (Positive FCF=0) 
Variable N Mean P25 Median P75 Std Dev   N Mean Median Std Dev   N Mean Median Std Dev 
Q 6,218 1.70 1.10 1.39 1.90 1.03 
 
3,835 1.81 1.48 1.08 
 
2,365 1.52 1.27 0.91 
FCF 6,218 0.01 -0.03 0.02 0.06 0.09 3,835 0.06 0.05 0.05 2,365 -0.07 -0.05 0.08 
Incidence 6,218 0.56 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.47 
 
3,835 0.55 0.87 0.47 
 
2,365 0.57 1.00 0.47 
Size 6,218 6.75 5.35 6.76 8.14 1.93 
 
3,835 7.04 7.06 1.90 
 
2,365 6.29 6.27 1.89 
Sales 6,218 6.71 5.36 6.69 8.09 1.92 
 
3,835 7.06 7.09 1.84 
 
2,365 6.14 6.10 1.92 
MTB 6,218 2.82 1.27 1.94 3.05 4.28 
 
3,835 2.96 2.14 3.65 
 
2,365 2.58 1.67 5.15 
RD 6,218 0.44 0.00 0.01 0.24 1.11 
 
3,835 0.41 0.03 1.03 
 
2,365 0.49 0.00 1.23 
Adv 6,218 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.25 
 
3,835 0.09 0.00 0.25 
 
2,365 0.08 0.00 0.24 
Capex 6,218 0.23 0.13 0.20 0.30 0.15 
 
3,835 0.23 0.19 0.14 
 
2,365 0.25 0.20 0.17 
Margin 6,218 0.12 0.06 0.12 0.19 0.17 
 
3,835 0.16 0.14 0.12 
 
2,365 0.06 0.09 0.23 
Leverage 6,218 0.24 0.06 0.19 0.37 0.22 
 
3,835 0.22 0.16 0.21 
 
2,365 0.28 0.24 0.24 
TA 6,218 4,160 210 863 3,432 8,721 3,835 5,098 1,160 9,904 2,365 2,631 529 6,036 
MVE 6,218 4,599 162 754 3,038 11,783  3,835 6,120 1,192 13,898  2,365 2,123 380 6,361 
K 6,218 0.37 0.10 0.19 0.37 0.57 
 
3,835 0.32 0.18 0.44 
 
2,365 0.45 0.19 0.73 
                 ∆Cash 6,033 0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.04 0.09 
 
3,758 0.03 0.01 0.08 
 
2,275 -0.01 0.00 0.11 
∆E 6,033 0.02 -0.03 0.01 0.04 0.17 
 
3,758 0.03 0.01 0.15 
 
2,275 0.00 0.00 0.20 
∆NA 6,033 0.03 -0.06 0.02 0.11 0.32 
 
3,758 0.01 0.02 0.28 
 
2,275 0.06 0.04 0.37 
∆RD 6,033 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 
 
3,758 0.00 0.00 0.01 
 
2,275 0.00 0.00 0.02 
∆Interest 6,033 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 
 
3,758 0.00 0.00 0.02 
 
2,275 0.00 0.00 0.02 
∆Div 6,033 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 
 
3,758 0.00 0.00 0.03 
 
2,275 0.00 0.00 0.03 
Casht-1 6,033 0.14 0.03 0.07 0.17 0.17 
 
3,758 0.12 0.07 0.14 
 
2,275 0.17 0.09 0.20 
NF 6,033 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.07   3,758 0.00 0.00 0.05   2,275 0.02 0.00 0.08 
 
This panel reports the descriptive statistics for firm characteristics. Tobin’s Q is the sum of market value of 
equity, liquidation value of preferred equity and book value of total liabilities scaled by total assets. FCF is 
measured as in Richardson (2006) in equation [1]. Incidence is weighted average negative performance 
incidence defined in the main text. Size is logged total assets. Sales is logged annual sales number. Market-
to-book is the ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity. RD is annual research and 
development expenditure scaled by property, plant, and equipment (PPE). Adv is annual advertising 
expense scaled by PPE. Capex is annual capital expenditure scaled PPE. Margin is the ratio of operating 
income before depreciation to sales. Leverage is the market leverage defined as total debt over the sum of 
total debt and the market value of equity.  TA is total assets. MVE is market value of equity. K is property, 
plant, and equipment scaled by sales. ∆Cash is the change in cash scaled by lagged market value of equity. 
Casht-1 is cash balance from last year. ∆EBIT is the change in earnings before extraordinary items plus 
interest, deferred tax credits, and investment tax credits. ∆Net Asset is the change in net assets where net 
assets are defined as total assets minus cash holdings scaled by lagged market value of equity. ∆Interest is 
the change in interest expense scaled by lagged market value of equity. ∆Dividend is the change in common 
dividends paid scaled by lagged market value of equity. Net Financing is the total equity issuance minus 
repurchases plus debt issuance minus debt redemption scaled by lagged market value of equity. ∆RD is the 
change in R&D expenditures scaled by lagged market value of equity. 
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Table 1, Panel B presents the descriptive statistics for variables used in the main tests. 
The primary dependent variable is Tobin’s Q, calculated as the sum of market value of 
equity, liquidation value of preferred equity, and book value of total liabilities, scaled by 
the book value of total assets. Originally proposed by Tobin (1969) and formalized in 
Hayashi (1982), Tobin’s Q measures investors’ valuation of a firm’s investment 
opportunities. As shown in Table 1, Panel B, the sample mean of Tobin’s Q is 1.70.  The 
subsample means of Tobin’s Q are 1.81 and 1.52 for the positive FCF sample and negative 
FCF sample, respectively. The difference is statistically significant (t-statistic =10.63, 
untabulated), consistent with idea that firms generating positive free cash flow are 
valued higher. The overall sample mean of Incidence is 0.56. While the means of Incidence 
for the two subsamples (0.55 and 0.57 for the positive and negative FCF subsample) are 
statistically different from each other at the 10% level (t-statistic 1.78, untabulated), the 
economic magnitude of the difference does not appear to be significant.  
Table 1, Panel B also provides summary statistics for other test variables. 
Specifically, FCF is defined in equation [1]; Size is logged total assets; MTB is the ratio of 
market value of equity to book value of equity; Sales is logged annual sales; RD is annual 
research and development expenditure, scaled by property, plant, and equipment (PPE); 
Adv is annual advertising expense scaled by PPE; Capex is annual capital expenditure 
scaled by PPE; and K is property, plant, and equipment (PPE), scaled by sales. As I 
conduct most analyses separately for positive FCF and negative FCF samples, I also 
report descriptive statistics in these two subsamples. 
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 Table 2 presents the sample correlations for variables used in the main firm value 
test. Pearson correlations for the positive and negative FCF samples are presented in the 
upper and lower corner, respectively, with p-values presented underneath the 
correlations. This table provides some preliminary evidence supporting H1. Incidence is 
negatively correlated with Tobin’s Q in the Positive FCF sample but is insignificantly 
correlated with Tobin’s Q in the negative FCF sample. These results are consistent with 
the hypothesis that firm values are negatively related to the history of value-destroying 
M&As for firms that are more likely to engage in future M&As.  
 
 
Table 2: Correlation Table 
 
Q Incidence Sales RD Adv Capex Margin Leverage K BM ∆Cash ∆CashUnexpected 
Q 
 
-0.14 0.02 0.19 0.03 0.25 0.26 -0.44 -0.08 -0.46 0.11 -0.01 
  
(0.00) (0.31) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.48) 
Incidence 0.01 
 
-0.09 0.04 0.00 0.01 -0.13 0.07 -0.06 0.07 -0.04 0.03 
 
(0.53) 
 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.96) (0.35) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.09) (0.14) 
Sales -0.19 -0.15 
 
-0.29 -0.04 -0.22 0.15 0.15 0.09 -0.02 0.03 -0.18 
 
(0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.36) (0.16) (0.00) 
RD 0.06 0.03 -0.13 
 
0.09 0.37 -0.15 -0.25 -0.17 -0.12 -0.03 0.23 
 
(0.00) (0.20) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.23) (0.00) 
Adv 0.02 0.02 -0.05 0.03 
 
0.14 -0.03 -0.01 -0.06 -0.01 0.01 0.07 
 
(0.31) (0.36) (0.03) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.06) (0.64) (0.00) (0.61) (0.62) (0.00) 
Capex 0.17 0.05 -0.22 0.10 0.08 
 
-0.02 -0.32 -0.22 -0.16 -0.02 0.10 
 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.19) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.30) (0.00) 
Margin -0.25 0.02 0.22 -0.08 0.00 -0.04 
 
-0.10 0.47 0.01 0.06 -0.15 
 
(0.00) (0.33) (0.00) (0.00) (0.88) (0.04) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.48) (0.00) (0.00) 
Leverage -0.22 0.07 0.28 -0.09 -0.06 -0.28 0.07 
 
0.21 0.44 -0.00 -0.15 
 
(0.00) (0.00) 0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.84) (0.00) 
K 0.01 -0.06 -0.13 -0.03 -0. 06 -0.09 -0.41 0.08 
 
-0.01 0.04 0.01 
 
(0.60) (0.01) (0.00) (0.19) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.81) (0.07) (0.62) 
BM -0.54 0.10 -0.20 -0.06 -0.00 -0.14 -0.29 0.45 0.01  -0.11 -0.01 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.90) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.46)  (0.00) (0.61) 
∆Cash -0.02 0.03 -0.08 0.06 0.05 -0.01 -0.06 0.01 -0.06 0.05  0.25 
 
(0.27) (0.10) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.61) (0.00) (0.49) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) 
∆CashUnexpected -0.09 0.08 -0.13 0.24 0.11 0.07 -0.15 -0.01 -0.10 0.09 0.57  
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.41) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
 
This table reports the sample correlation for variables used in the main firm value test. Pearson correlations 
are presented in the upper corner for the positive FCF sample and in the lower corner for the negative FCF 
sample, respectively. P-values are presented underneath the correlations. Tobin’s Q is the sum of market 
value of equity, liquidation value of preferred equity and book value of total liabilities scaled by total assets. 
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Sales is logged annual sales number. RD is annual research and development expenditure scaled by PPE. 
Adv is annual advertising expense scaled by PPE. Capex is annual capital expenditure scaled by PPE. 
Margin is the ratio of operating income before depreciation to sales. Leverage is the market leverage defined 
as total debt over the sum of total debt and the market value of equity. K is property, plant, and equipment 
scaled by sales.  BM is the book-to-market ratio. ∆Cash is the change in cash scaled by lagged market value 
of equity. ∆CashExcess is the change in unexpected cash (defined in Section 4.3). 
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4 Main empirical analysis 
4.1 Validating the use of FCF as a proxy for future M&A 
 An important assumption in my empirical analysis is that firms with positive 
free cash flow are more likely to make future acquisitions than firms with negative free 
cash flow. This assumption is motivated theoretically by Jensen’s free cash flow 
hypothesis in that firms with free cash flow are more likely to make empire-building 
investments. While this assumption has found empirical support from prior literature 
(e.g., Lang et al. (1991) among others), I provide empirical evidence for its validity for 
my sample of firms. Specifically, I estimate a Logit model that predicts acquisitions with 
FCF (Positive FCF) and other firm characteristics. The Logit model is similar to that in 
Harford (1999) and Song and Walkling (2000):  
Acquisitioni,t 
=α+ β1FCFi,t  (or Positive CFi,t)+β2Sizei,t+β3Growthi,t+β4MTBi,t+β5PEi,t+β6Levi,t+β7NWCAPi,t+ui,t       [3] 
where the dependent variable Acquisition takes a value of one if a firm-year observation 
is associated with a merger and acquisition announcement in the [-183, 183] window 
around the annual fiscal period end date. I select this window to capture the idea that 
managers make M&A decisions when the realization of operations in a year is known or 
close to known to managers. Size is logged total assets. Growth, MTB, PE, Lev, and 
NWCAP are sales growth, market-to-book ratio, price-to-earnings ratio, market leverage 
ratio (defined as total debt over the sum of total debt and market value of equity), and 
non-cash working capital scaled by total assets, all averaged over the past four years, 
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respectively. FCF is defined in equation [1]. Positive FCF is defined the same as above.  I 
include year fixed effects in all panel data regressions throughout this paper. In addition, 
to avoid both cross-sectional and time-series dependence, all standard errors are 
clustered both by firm and by year (Petersen (2009)). To the extent that firms with 
positive free cash flow are more likely to attempt acquisitions, I expect a positive 
coefficient estimate for FCF and Positive FCF. 
   Table 3: Predicting Acquisitions 
  Predicted signs (1) (2) 
FCF + 2.139***  
  (2.71)  
Positive FCF +  0.288** 
   (2.57) 
Size + 0.287*** 0.290*** 
  
(7.78) (7.98) 
Growth + 1.357*** 1.291*** 
  
(4.87) (4.46) 
Lev - -2.314*** -2.374*** 
  
(-4.97) (-4.97) 
MTB 
 
-0.021 -0.012 
  
(-0.59) (-0.34) 
PE 
 
-0.0008 -0.0008 
  
(-0.36) (-0.35) 
NWCAP 
 
-0.359 -0.291 
  
(-0. 69) (-0.56) 
Intercept 
 
Yes Yes 
N 
 
6,290 6,290 
Pseudo R-squared   0.082 0.081 
 
This table reports results from a Logit regression of acquisition likelihood on firm characteristics. The 
dependent variable Acquisition takes one if a firm-year observation is associated with merger and 
acquisition announcement and zero otherwise. FCF is measured as in Richardson (2006) in equation [1]. 
Positive FCF is a dummy variable and takes one if the free cash flow measured as in Richardson (2006) is 
positive and zero otherwise. Size is logged total assets. Sales Growth is the average sales growth rate over 
the past four years. Market-to-book is the average market-to-book ratio over the past four years. Price-to-
earnings is the average price-to-earnings ratio over the past four years. Leverage is the average market 
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leverage ratio over the past four years where leverage ratio is calculated as total debt over the sum of total 
debt and the market value of equity. Non-cash working capital is the average working capital scaled by total 
assets over the past four years. All standard errors are two-way clustered by both firm and year.  Z-statistics 
are presented underneath the coefficient estimates and ***, **, and * indicate that estimates are significantly 
different from zero at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 Table 3 presents the estimation results. In Column (1), the coefficient estimate for 
FCF (β=2.139, z-statistic=2.71) is statistically significant from zero at the 1% level. In 
Column (2), the coefficient estimate for Positive FCF (β=0.288, z-statistic=2.57) is 
positively and statistically significantly associated with the likelihood of attempting an 
acquisition, consistent with firms with positive free cash flow being more likely to be 
acquirers. Coefficients on other firm characteristics are consistent with prior research. I 
conclude from this table that firms with positive free cash flow are more likely to engage 
in acquisitions. Viewed together with findings in Richardson (2006), firms with positive 
free cash flow have both the tendency and ability to invest in future acquisitions. 
Therefore, it is appropriate to use free cash flow (i.e., the dummy variable Positive FCF) 
as my main partitioning variable to group firms into likely acquirers and unlikely 
acquirers.1 
4.2 Evidence for the anticipation discount 
To examine whether investors place a discount on firms with anticipated value-
destroying M&As, I apply the specification proposed by Himmelberg et al. (1999) and 
used by several recent studies (e.g., Habib and Ljungqvist (2005), Edmans et al. (2012)):  
                                                          
1 Results are similar if I use the predicted probability from equation [3] to partition firms into likely 
acquirers and unlikely acquirers.  
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Qi,t=α+β1Salesi,t+β2Sales2i,t+β3RDi,t+β4Advi,t+β5Capexi,t+β6Margini,t+β7Leveragei,t+β8Ki,t+β9K2i,t+ 
β10Incidencei,t+ui,t [4] 
where Q is Tobin’s Q and other firm characteristics are as defined earlier. 2 I estimate 
equation [4] on three samples: positive FCF, negative FCF, and the full sample. The main 
independent variable in these regressions is Incidence, defined in Section 3.2. H1 predicts 
a negative coefficient estimate on Incidence in the positive FCF sample but not on the 
negative FCF sample. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2 An alternative approach to examine investors’ expectations is to use analysts’ forecasted price targets. In 
untabulated robustness checks, I also conduct analysis in a subsample using analysts’ forecasted price 
targets to calculate expected Tobin’s Q in the robustness check section. Results and inferences are very 
similar to those reported in Table 4.   
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Table 4: Firm Value Test 
Panel A: The Main Test 
   (1)  (2)  (3)    (4)  (5)  (6) 
 
Main Sample 
 
Matched Pseudo Sample 
  FCF>=0 FCF<0 Full sample 
 
FCF>=0 FCF<0 Full sample 
Incidence -0.179*** -0.0131 0.0564 
 
-0.0795 -0.107 -0.0668 
 
(-3.42) (-0.28) (1.03) 
 
(-1.02) (-1.42) (-0.87) 
Positive FCF 
  
0.297*** 
   
0.359*** 
   
(5.30) 
   
(4.80) 
Positive FCF* Incidence 
  
-0.290*** 
   
-0.130 
   
(-3.58) 
   
(-1.26) 
Sales 0.0237 -0.378** -0.220* 
 
-0.0143 -0.382*** -0.198* 
 
(0.20) (-2.31) (-1.78) 
 
(-0.12) (-2.85) (-1.87) 
Sales2 0.00128 0.0262** 0.0169** 
 
0.00376 0.0281*** 0.0170** 
 
(0.16) (2.27) (2.01) 
 
(0.44) (2.84) (2.21) 
RD 0.0962** 0.0214 0.0621* 
 
-0.00430 0.122** 0.0623* 
 
(2.04) (0.73) (1.79) 
 
(-0.12) (2.54) (1.71) 
Adv 0.0248 0.0190 -0.00826 
 
0.120 -0.213*** -0.0127 
 
(0.21) (0.18) (-0.10) 
 
(1.03) (-2.95) (-0.14) 
Capex 0.783*** 0.435** 0.753*** 
 
1.296*** 0.555** 1.045*** 
 
(3.38) (2.43) (4.79) 
 
(4.43) (2.38) (5.36) 
Margin 3.099*** -0.109 0.617*** 
 
1.911*** -0.279** -0.256** 
 
(7.90) (-0.64) (3.20) 
 
(3.25) (-2.32) (-2.10) 
Leverage -1.930*** -1.491*** -2.001*** 
 
-2.599*** -1.566*** -2.262*** 
 
(-10.42) (-8.15) (-10.76) 
 
(-14.05) (-10.55) (-14.36) 
K -0.271* 0.387*** 0.260*** 
 
-0.377* 0.159 0.0980 
 
(-1.90) (3.92) (2.67) 
 
(-1.69) (1.64) (1.42) 
K2 -0.0559 -0.109*** -0.0844*** 
 
0.0187 -0.0188 -0.00618 
 
(-1.44) (-3.46) (-2.78) 
 
(0.54) (-0.68) (-0.30) 
Missing RD 0.0001 0.0004* 0.0002* 
 
0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000 
 
(-1.96) (0.78) (-1.36) 
 
(0.67) (-1.30) (0.05) 
Missing Adv 0.0001 0.0004* 0.0002* 
 
0.140* 0.0386 0.103* 
 
(1.29) (1.71) (1.95) 
 
(1.79) (0.65) (1.80) 
Intercept Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
N 3,853 2,365 6,218 
 
3,271 2,420 5,691 
Adjusted R-squared 0.403 0.285 0.315   0.32 0.322 0.266 
 
This panel reports results from an OLS regression of Tobin’s Q on past history of merger and acquisition in 
addition to firm characteristics. Tobin’s Q is the sum of market value of equity, liquidation value of 
preferred equity and book value of total liabilities scaled by total assets. Sales is logged annual sales number. 
RD is annual research and development expenditure scaled by PPE. Adv is annual advertising expense 
scaled by PPE. Capex is annual capital expenditure scaled by PPE. Margin is the ratio of operating income 
before depreciation to sales. Leverage is market leverage defined as total debt over the sum of total debt and 
the market value of equity. K is property, plant, and equipment scaled by sales. Missing RD (Missing Adv) 
takes one if the annual RD (Adv) is missing and zero otherwise. Incidence is weighted average negative 
performance incidence defined in the main text. Positive FCF is a dummy variable and takes one if the free 
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cash flow measured as in Richardson (2006) is positive and zero otherwise. All standard errors are two-way 
clustered by both firm and year.  T-statistics are presented underneath the coefficient estimates and ***, **, 
and * indicate that estimates are significantly different from zero (two-tailed test) at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
Panel B:  The Coefficient Estimates of Incidence in FCF Quintiles 
 
Lowest FCF Quintile Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Highest FCF Quintile 
Incidence 0.013 -0.013 -0.008 -0.120** -0.333*** 
t-statistics (0.20) (-0.33) (-0.20) (-2.31) (-3.05) 
 
This panel reports the coefficient estimates of Incidence from an OLS regression of Tobin’s Q on Incidence 
and other firm characteristics by FCF quintiles. All variables are defined in the same way as in Table 4 Panel 
A. The coefficient estimates of other firm characteristics variables are included in the regression but not 
shown in this panel for the sake of brevity. T-statistics are presented underneath the coefficient estimates 
and ***, **, and * indicate that estimates are significantly different from zero at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 
Panel C:  The Effects of Corporate Governance, Earnings Quality, and CEO Turnover 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
 
FCF>=0 FCF<0 FCF>=0 FCF<0 FCF>=0 FCF<0 
Incidence -0.188** -0.00906 -0.243** -0.009 -0.242** -0.0109 
 
(-2.02) (-0.15) (-2.52) (-0.12) (-2.47) (-0.11) 
Governance -0.0153 0.0180 
  
  
 
(-0.16) (0.23) 
  
  
Incidence * Governance 0.0200 -0.0924 
  
  
 
(0.17) (-0.98) 
  
  
Quality  
  
-0.200** 0.0344   
   
(-2.04) (0.50)   
Incidence * Quality 
  
0.118 -0.0595   
   
(1.05) (-0.66)   
Turnover   -0.0248 -0.0449 
     (-0.33) (-0.78) 
Incidence * Turnover     0.131 -0.0722 
     (1.21) (-0.78) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
This panel reports results from an OLS regression of Tobin’s Q on past history of merger and acquisition in 
addition to firm characteristics. This table reports results from an OLS regression of Tobin’s Q on past 
history of merger and acquisition in addition to firm characteristics. Governance takes one if the G-index 
from Gompers et al. (2003) is lower than the annual sample median and zero otherwise.  Quality takes one if 
the earnings quality measure (proxied by accruals quality (AQ) where higher AQ means poorer quality) is 
lower than the annual sample median and zero otherwise. Turnover takes one if a firm has changed its CEO 
over the ten-year rolling window and zero otherwise. The coefficient estimates of other firm characteristics 
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variables are included in the regression but not shown in this panel for the sake of brevity. All standard 
errors are two-way clustered by both firm and year. T-statistics are presented underneath the coefficient 
estimates and ***, **, and * indicate that estimates are significantly different from zero at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively.  
Table 4, Panel A presents the OLS regression results. Consistent with H1, 
Column (1) shows that the coefficient estimate on Incidence in the positive FCF sample is 
negative at -0.179 and is statistically significant at less than the 1% level (t-statistic=-3.42). 
In contrast, in Column (2), the coefficient on Incidence in the negative FCF sample is not 
significantly different from zero at conventional significance levels (β=-0.013, t-statistic=-
0.28). These results indicate that when the likelihood of attempting future M&As is high 
(suggested by having positive free cash flow, i.e., the firm is likely to invest higher than 
predicted levels), investors place a higher discount on firm value for firms with histories 
of value-destroying M&As. However, when firms are less likely to attempt M&As (as 
proxied by negative free cash flow, i.e., the firm is unlikely to invest higher than 
predicted levels), firm value is not sensitive to its over-investment histories. On average, 
among firms with positive free cash flow, firm value decreases by 0.179 when moving 
from firms with the best history achievable (Incidence=0) to firms with the worst history 
(Incidence=1). The discount is economically significant, representing 10% of the average 
Tobin’s Q (1.81) in the positive FCF sample. When the regression is estimated on the full 
sample in Column (3), the interaction between Positive FCF and Incidence is negative and 
statistically significant (β=-0.290, t-statistic= -3.58), emphasizing that it is the combination 
of both anticipated likelihood and the over-investment history that matter in the firm 
value discount. To summarize, these findings are consistent with investors forming 
expectations about the profitability of future M&A investment decisions based on the 
   33 
 
realized performance outcomes of their past acquisitions and valuing these firms 
accordingly based on the likelihood of these firms engaging in future acquisitions.  
The dependent variable in Table 4 is firms’ valuations at least three years after 
their most recent completed acquisitions. A potential concern for my research design is 
that the observed relation between Incidence and Tobin’s Q may be driven by a 
mechanical relation between previous stock market performance and future firm values 
in that the stock return underperformance may affect future firm values, resulting in 
lowered Tobin’s Q at the time of my analysis. 3 This explanation would otherwise predict 
a negative relation between Tobin’s Q and Incidence for all firms, both positive FCF and 
negative FCF samples. In contrast, Table 4, Panel A shows that this is not the case. 
Incidence is negatively related to Tobin’s Q only for firms with positive free cash flow.   
To further establish that results in Table 4, Panel A are not simply capturing a 
mechanical relation between past stock returns and current valuations, I conduct a 
falsification analysis on a matched sample. Specifically, I match each M&A firm with a 
non-M&A firm with the closest market capitalization in the same Fama-French (1997) 
48-industry from the entire Compustat database at the time of its first M&A. I use the 
actual M&A announcement date and completion date as the pseudo-dates for the 
matched non-M&A firm. For each non-M&A firm, I calculate Incidence the same way as 
described in Section 3.2 but using pseudo dates and the returns of the non-M&A match 
firm. Therefore, Incidence captures the stock performance of the matched sample the 
                                                          
3 The mechanical relation is unlikely to be the explanation for results in regressions with control variables as 
the firm fundamental variables will pick up the effect of acquisition performance on firm values.  
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same way it does for the sample M&A firms in years prior to valuation. I estimate 
equation [4] on this matched sample and present results in Columns (4)-(5), for the 
matched sample firms with positive FCF and negative FCF, respectively. Unlike that in 
Column (1), the coefficient estimate for Incidence in Column (4) is statistically 
indistinguishable from zero at conventional levels on the matched positive FCF sample. 
When the equation is estimated in the full matched sample, the interaction between 
Positive FCF and Incidence in Column (6) is not significantly different from zero. These 
results provide evidence that my findings in Columns (1)-(3) are due to investors’ 
expectation of both the profitability and the likelihood of future acquisitions and not to a 
mechanical relation between previous stock returns and future firm values. 
Table 4, Panel A also reveals that the control variables are related to firm value in 
manners consistent with prior literature. Specifically, Columns (1) to (6) show that Capex 
is generally positively and significantly associated with Tobin’s Q and Leverage is 
negatively and significantly associated with Tobin’s Q.  Margin is positively associated 
with Tobin’s Q in the positive FCF sample but not in the negative FCF sample. Lastly, in 
Columns (3) and (6), the coefficient on Positive FCF is positive and strongly significant (t-
statistic =5.30 and 4.80, respectively), suggesting that firms with positive free cash flow 
are valued higher than firms with negative free cash flow. The difference between 
Columns (3) and (6) is that the positive effect of FCF on firm value is lower for acquiring 
firms with poorer histories of post-acquisition performance (Column (3)) but is 
unaffected by non-acquiring firms’ past stock performance (Column (6)). 
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Results in Columns (1) to (3) in Panel A are predicated on the assumption that 
investors assess equal likelihood of future M&A activities for firms with any amountof 
positive free cash flow. This assumption can be restrictive in that it ignores the effect of 
the actual magnitude of free cash flow. To examine the robustness of the discount to this 
assumption, In Table 4, Panel B, I sort firm-year observations by FCF into five quintiles 
and re-estimate equation [4] for each FCF quintile. All firm characteristics are included 
in the regression but I only report the coefficient on Incidence for the sake of brevity. 
Incidence is insignificantly related to firm value for the three lowest FCF quintiles, but is 
significantly and negatively related to firm value in the two highest FCF quintiles. The 
coefficient on Incidence almost decreases monotonically from the lowest FCF quintile to 
the highest FCF quintile. For firms in the highest FCF quintile, the coefficient estimate 
for Incidence is -0.333 (t-statistic=-3.05), suggesting that Tobin’s Q for firms with the best 
history (Incidence=0) is significantly higher than for the firm with worst history 
(Incidence=1) by 15% (=0.333/2.23, the sample mean Tobin’s Q in the highest FCF quintile, 
untabulated). These results support the anticipation channel: firm values embed 
anticipated profitability of future M&A investments as well as investors’ expectations of 
the likelihood of firms engaging in future M&A. Past over-investment history is more 
pertinent to firm valuations when the anticipated likelihood of future acquisitions is 
high.  
So far, I document that investors form expectations about future investment 
based on past investment outcomes and value firms based on the likelihood of M&A 
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attempts. In Table 4, Panel C, I further explore whether corporate governance and 
information quality (as captured by firms’ accruals quality) have any mitigating effects. 
The idea is that strong corporate governance may mitigate the agency problem of over-
investment (Richardson (2006)) and high earnings quality may improve firms’ 
investment efficiency by better monitoring managers (Biddle et al. (2009)). Therefore, I 
consider the effects of corporate governance and earnings quality in the relation between 
firm values and past over-investment history. In Table 4, Panel C, I interact indicators of 
corporate governance and earnings quality with the main independent variable Incidence. 
Governance takes a value of one if a firm-year observation has a G-index below the 
annual sample median (Gompers et al. (2003)) and zero otherwise. 4 Quality takes a value 
of one if the firm-year’s accruals quality is below the annual sample median and zero 
otherwise. Accruals quality is estimated cross-sectionally as in Francis et al. (2005).5 In 
Columns (1) and (2), I interact Incidence with Governance. As before, the coefficient on 
Incidence is negative and statistically significant in Column (1), but is insignificantly 
different from zero in Column (2). The coefficient on Incidence * Governance is positive for 
the positive FCF sample but is not statistically significant at conventional levels. An F-
                                                          
4 The corporate governance index from Gompers et al. (2003) is constructed from Investor Responsibility 
Research Center (IRRC, now RiskMetrics). Specifically, they construct their indices based on 24 antitakeover 
provisions. They add one point for each provision that enhances managerial power to arrive at a 
comprehensive index for each firm-year. Higher index indicates weaker corporate governance. As discussed 
in Masulis et al. (2007), IRRC publishes volumes every six years from 1990. I assume that between each 
consecutive IRRC publication, a firm’s corporate governance provisions remain the same as the previous 
publication year. Empirical results, however, are not sensitive to this assumption. 
5Specifically, I estimate accruals quality following Francis et al. (2005). Specifically, I estimate TCAj,t = 
φ0+φ1CFOj,t-1+φ2CFOj,t+φ3CFOj,t+1 + φ4∆Rev j, t +φ5PPE j, t + v j,t in each Fama-French 48-industry. TCA is total 
current accruals. CFO is cash flow from operations. ∆Rev is change in revenues. PPE is property, plant and 
equipment. All variables are scaled by average total assets. Accruals quality is the five-year rolling standard 
deviation of firm j’s residuals, vj,t calculated over years t-4 through t. Larger standard deviations of residuals 
indicate poorer accruals quality. 
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test shows that the sum of the coefficients on Incidence and Incidence * Governance is 
statistically significantly different from zero (p-value=0.06). The coefficient on Incidence is 
negative and statistically significant in Column (3), but insignificantly different from 
zero in Column (4). The coefficient on Incidence * Quality is positive for the positive FCF 
sample but is not statistically significant at conventional levels. An F-test shows that the 
sum of the coefficients on Incidence and Incidence * Quality is statistically different from 
zero (p-value=0.04). Taken together, I find that strong corporate governance structure or 
good earnings quality, at best, weakly mitigates the discount caused by past over-
investment for positive FCF firms through the anticipation effect. 6 
Results in Panel A show that firm value is related to past over-investment 
through investors’ anticipation of future investments. Prior research finds that CEOs 
play a significant role in firms’ investment strategies (Malmendier and Tate (2008)). To 
the extent that a firm may replace its CEO after its value-destroying acquisitions (Lehn 
and Zhao (2006)), I further explore whether CEO turnover has any mitigating effect 
using a subsample of firms with available CEO data from the Executive Compensation 
database (ExecuComp). 7 Turnover takes a value of one if a firm changed its CEO during 
the ten-year rolling window and zero otherwise. I interact Incidence with Turnover and 
present results in Columns (5) and (6). The coefficient on Incidence is negative and 
statistically significant in Column (5), but is insignificant from zero in Column (6). The 
                                                          
6 I also use the entrenchment-index constructed by Bebchuk et al. (2009). The results are qualitatively similar.  
7 I acknowledge the limitation to the generalizability of the mitigating effect of CEO turnover. Compustat 
ExecuComp database covers executive compensation data for S&P 1500 firms from 1992. As I require ten-
year’s data to calculate Incidence, I use firm-year observations after 2002 with available CEO data in this test. 
The reported results are biased toward large firms and recent years.  
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coefficient on Incidence * Turnover is positive for the positive FCF sample (Column (5)) 
but is not statistically significantly different from zero at conventional levels. An F-test 
shows that the sum of the coefficients on Incidence and Incidence * Turnover is statistically 
different from zero (p-value=0.08). Although the firm value discount is still statistically 
significant even for firms with CEO replacement, the economic magnitude of the 
discount with CEO replacement shrinks by more than 50%, from 0.24 to 0.11. This is 
consistent with investors relying less on histories of over-investment for firms with CEO 
replacement. To summarize, I conclude that CEO replacement, weakly mitigates the 
anticipated firm value discount for future investments based on the history of over-
investment in M&A.  
4.3 Channels of the discount: marginal value of cash holdings 
  The previous discussion addresses the relation between future firm values and 
past M&A performance. H2 directly assesses investors’ valuation of firms’ cash holdings. 
I estimate the marginal value of cash using the specification in Faulkender and Wang 
(2006): 
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Table 5: Marginal Value of Cash 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  FCF>=0 FCF<0 FCF>=0 FCF<0 ∆CashUnexpected>=0 ∆CashUnexpected<0 
∆Cash 2.216*** 1.120** 
    
 
(3.54) (2.03) 
    ∆CashExpected 
  
1.957*** 1.391** 1.432*** 0.586 
   
(3.02) (2.19) (2.60) (0.65) 
∆CashUnExpected 
  
2.067*** 0.676 1.707*** 1.340 
   
(4.04) (1.44) (5.79) (1.49) 
Incidence*∆Cash -0.867** -0.219 
    
 
(-1.97) (-0.56) 
    Incidence*∆CashExpected 
  
-0.563 0.0552 -0.130 -0.00463 
   
(-1.26) (0.14) (-0.73) (-0.01) 
Incidence*∆CashUnexpected 
  
-0.877** -0.350 -0.499** -0.776 
   
(-2.48) (-0.76) (-2.33) (-1.41) 
∆NA 0.166*** 0.275*** 0.173*** 0.294*** 0.251*** 0.157 
 
(2.93) (4.98) (3.22) (5.22) (4.35) (1.64) 
Incidence*∆NA -0.0383 -0.0224 -0.0449 -0.0358 -0.121 0.106 
 
(-0.47) (-0.30) (-0.55) (-0.48) (-1.46) (0.77) 
∆E 0.642*** 0.503*** 0.656*** 0.473*** 0.644*** 0.552*** 
 
(5.42) (3.56) (5.19) (3.08) (3.94) (6.50) 
∆RD 0.452 -0.585 0.709 -0.431 -0.0921 1.000 
 
(0.41) (-0.41) (0.67) (-0.35) (-0.10) (0.85) 
∆Interest -2.220*** -2.340* -2.347*** -2.353* -2.053** -3.715*** 
 
(-3.53) (-1.85) (-3.92) (-1.85) (-2.28) (-3.17) 
∆Div 0.557*** 0.0611 0.527*** 0.130 0.458*** -0.583* 
 
(3.68) (0.27) (3.56) (0.62) (3.57) (-1.87) 
NF 1.150*** 1.108** 1.135*** 1.142*** 0.836*** 1.053*** 
 
(3.67) (2.52) (3.60) (3.01) (2.68) (2.88) 
Lev -0.335*** -0.463*** -0.333*** -0.487*** -0.327*** -0.532*** 
 
(-6.54) (-3.59) (-6.96) (-3.40) (-3.30) (-7.09) 
Casht-1 0.414*** 0.191** 0.169 0.927 0.302 0.129 
 
(3.19) (2.35) (0.62) (1.04) (0.50) (0.26) 
Leverage*∆Cash -2.235*** -0.585 
    
 
(-3.21) (-1.10) 
    Casht-1*∆Cash -1.523** -1.166 
    
 
(-2.02) (-1.20) 
    Casht-1*∆CashExpected 
  
-1.402* 0.194 0.0414 -2.284 
   
(-1.91) (0.29) (0.10) (-1.21) 
Casht-1*∆CashUnexpected 
  
-0.620 0.0794 -0.108 -4.131 
   
(-1.20) (0.11) (-0.38) (-0.45) 
Lev*∆CashExpected 
  
-1.981** -0.585 -1.673*** 1.050 
   
(-2.47) (-1.30) (-4.15) (0.89) 
Lev*∆CashUnexpected 
  
-2.111*** -0.280 -1.869*** 0.132 
   
(-3.20) (-0.59) (-4.09) (0.07) 
Incidence -0.000 0.0132 0.0109 0.0374* 0.0297 -0.0558 
 
(-0.00) (0.66) (0.72) (1.75) (1.21) (-1.15) 
Interest Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 3,758 2,275 3,758 2,275 3,158 2,875 
Adjusted R-squared 0.165 0.133 0.168 0.136 0.142 0.146 
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This table reports results from an OLS regression of annual stock returns on past history plus firm 
characteristics. The dependent variable Ri-Rb is the size and book-to-market adjusted compounded annual 
realized returns from fiscal year t-1 to t. Incidence is weighted average negative performance incidence 
defined in the main text. ∆Cash is the change in cash. ∆CashExpected is the change in expected cash. ∆CashExcess 
is the change in unexpected cash. Casht-1 is cash balance from last year. ∆E is the change in earnings before 
extraordinary items plus interest, deferred tax credits, and investment tax credits. ∆NA is the change in net 
assets where net assets are defined as total assets minus cash holdings. ∆Interest is the change in interest 
expense. ∆Div is the change in common dividends paid. Leverage is the market leverage defined as total 
debt over the sum of total debt and the market value of equity. NF is the total equity issuance minus 
repurchases plus debt issuance minus debt redemption. ∆RD is the change in R&D expenditures. All 
independent variables except Leverage and Incidence are deflated by the lagged market value of equity. All 
standard errors are two-way clustered by both firm and year. T-statistics are presented underneath the 
coefficient estimates and ***, **, and * indicate that estimates are significantly different from zero at 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level, respectively. 
The dependent variable ri,t - ri,tb is the compounded size and book-to-market 
adjusted realized returns from fiscal year t-1 to t. ∆Cash is the change in cash. Casht-1 is 
the cash balance from last year. ∆E is the change in earnings before extraordinary items 
plus interest, deferred tax credits, and investment tax credits. ∆NA is the change in net 
assets, where net assets are defined as total assets minus cash holdings. ∆Interest is the 
change in interest expense. ∆Div is the change in common dividends paid. Leverage is 
total debt over the sum of total debt and the market value of equity. NF is the total 
equity issuance minus repurchases plus debt issuance minus debt redemption. ∆RD is 
the change in R&D expenditures. All independent variables except Leverage and 
Incidence are deflated by the market value of equity in year t-1. This deflation allows the 
coefficient estimates to be interpreted as the marginal values of the right-hand-side 
variables. I interact Incidence with ∆Cash to examine whether investors place a discount 
on the marginal cash holdings of firms with over-investment histories. I also interact 
Incidence with ∆NA to ascertain whether there is an associated discount on noncash 
assets. 
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 Table 5 presents the OLS regression results. The main variable of interest is the 
interaction term between Incidence and ∆Cash. In Columns (1) and (2), I estimate 
equation [5] separately for the positive and negative FCF samples. The coefficients on 
∆Cash are 2.216 and 1.120 for the positive and negative FCF samples, respectively. This 
means that on average, in the absence of past over-investment, each additional dollar 
held by a firm with zero cash and no leverage is valued by investors at $2.216 and $1.120 
for the positive FCF and negative samples, respectively. This contrast is consistent with 
intuitions from stock valuation that on average, firms generating positive free cash flow 
have higher marginal values of cash than those generating negative free cash flow in 
absence of past over-investment history. Most importantly, for the positive FCF sample, 
the coefficient on the interaction between Incidence and ∆Cash is negative and is 
statistically significant at the 5% level in Column (1). The discount in marginal cash 
valuation is also economically significant, indicating that among firms with positive free 
cash flow, an additional dollar of cash is valued 87 cents less for firms with the worst 
history of value-destroying acquisitions compared with firms with the best history. 
However, the interaction term is indistinguishable from zero at conventional 
significance levels in Column (2) for the negative FCF sample. Coefficients on ∆NA and 
∆E are generally positive and significant in both columns, consistent with investors 
assigning higher values for firms with strong balance sheet asset positions and net 
earnings growth. Results for other control variables are also similar to findings in 
Faulkender and Wang (2006).  
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The analysis in Table 4 Panel A shows that in the positive FCF sample, moving 
from a firm with the best past history to a firm with the worst history results in a 
decrease in Tobin’s Q of 0.179. Assuming that the marginal value of cash is a good proxy 
for the average value of cash, the result in Column (1) indicates that around 80% 
((0.867*(∆Casht+Casht-1)*MVE/Total assets)/0.179, all expressed in the positive FCF sample 
averages) of the discount in Tobin’s Q documented in Table 4 is due to the discount in 
cash holdings. This is consistent with H2 in that when the likelihood of future 
acquisition using cash is high, investors discount the value of marginal cash for firms 
with anticipated unprofitable M&As. In contrast, the coefficient on the interaction 
between Incidence and ∆NA in Column (1) is insignificant from zero, suggesting that the 
marginal value of noncash assets is not discounted by investors for firms with 
anticipated value-destroying M&As. This is consistent with theoretical predictions in 
Myers and Majluf (1984) and Myers and Rajan (1998) that noncash assets are less likely 
to subject to tunneling risk than cash assets.  
 To further study investors’ differential pricing of marginal value of cash, I 
decompose the change in cash balance into an expected component and an unexpected 
component in Columns (3) and (4), whereas the expected component captures cash 
required due to firms’ normal, expected levels of operating, investing and financing 
needs. To predict future cash balance, I adopt the modified Opler et al. (1999) model to 
estimate the optimal cash balance using last year’s financial variables.  
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ln(Cash) i,t=α+β1ln(MVE)i ,t-1+β2Growthi,t-1+β3CFi,t-1+β4NWCAPi,t-1+β5CAPXi,t-1+β6Debti,t-1+β7RDi,t-
1+β8DDivi,t-1 +ui,t  [6] 
 MVE is the market value of equity; Growth is sales growth; CF is operating 
income less interest, taxes, and common dividends scaled by the market value of equity 
in year t-1; NWCAP is net non-cash working capital scaled by the market value of equity 
in year t-1; CAPX is capital expenditures scaled by the market value of equity in year t-1; 
Debt is total debt calculated as long-term debt plus the current portion of long-term debt 
scaled by the market value of equity in year t-1; RD is research and development 
expenses scaled by the market value of equity in year t-1; and DDIV is a dummy 
variable that is set to one if the firm pays dividends and zero otherwise. Equation [6] is 
estimated separately for each of the Fama-French 48 industries (1997) in the entire 
Compustat population. I apply the coefficient estimates to my sample firms and use the 
fitted values as the predicted value of next-year’s normal level of cash balance. The 
difference between the predicted cash and observed cash balance is the change in 
unexpected cash. The difference between predicted cash and last period’s cash is the 
change in expected cash. I then re-estimate equation *5+ by decomposing ∆Cash into the 
change in expected cash (∆CashExpected) and the change in unexpected cash (∆CashUnexpected).   
 Columns (3) and (4) of Table 5 report the results from decomposing ∆Cash into 
∆CashExpected and ∆CashUnexpected for the positive FCF and negative FCF samples, respectively. 
The coefficient on Incidence*∆CashUnexpected is negative and statistically significant only in 
the positive FCF sample. The coefficient on Incidence*ΔCashExpected is not significantly 
different from zero in either column. The magnitude of the discount is also economically 
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significant: one dollar of unexpected cash is valued 88 cents lower by investors for firms 
with the worst history of over-investment than firms with the best history. Taken 
together, this suggests that the discount on the marginal value of cash that we observed 
in Column (1) comes mainly from the unexpected portion of cash.  
 ∆CashUnexpected in Columns (3) and (4) is the residual term from equation [6]. As it 
can be both positive (excess cash) and negative (shortage in cash), I further ensure that 
my results capture investors’ discount on excess cash. I partition my sample into firms 
that have excess cash and firms that have a cash shortage and re-estimate the 
decomposed version of equation [5]. Results are presented in Columns (5) and (6). As 
predicted, the coefficient on Incidence *∆CashUnexpected is only negative and statistically 
significant for the excess cash sample, consistent with investors placing a discount on 
firms with managers extracting rents from cash beyond what is expected for these firms. 
Firm characteristics in Columns (2) through (6) are estimated similarly as in Column (1). 
In almost all columns, the coefficient of Incidence itself is not statistically significant from 
zero at conventional levels. Taken together, I find that investors place a discount on a 
firm’s marginal value of cash for firms with histories of value-destroying acquisitions 
when the likelihood of future M&As is high, and this discount is mainly on the firm’s 
excess cash that is unexpected given the firm’s business model.  
4.4 Channels of the discount: information uncertainty 
Erickson et al. (2012) find that for acquiring firms, analysts’ forecast dispersion 
after acquisitions is negatively associated with post-acquisition returns. They interpret 
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their findings as consistent with the idea that acquisitions increase investors’ uncertainty 
about future earnings, which leads to a higher cost of capital and therefore lower market 
valuation. In H3, I further examine whether the anticipation effect affects firm value 
through the discount rate channel in anticipating possible acquisitions. I conduct my 
analysis using a subsample of firms followed by at least three analysts. As in Erickson et 
al. (2012), I use analyst forecast dispersion as a proxy for information uncertainty. I 
estimate analyst forecast dispersion as a function of firm characteristics and Incidence as 
follows: 
Dispersioni,t 
=α+β1Incidencei,t+β2Sizei,t+β3RDi,t+β4Advi,t+β5MFi,t+β6Volatilityi,t+β7Betai,t+β8Newsi,t+β9Complexityi,t+ui,t [7] 
 The dependent variable Dispersion is the standard deviation of IBES analysts’ 
one-year ahead annual EPS forecasts scaled by the median forecast. 8 Size is logged total 
assets. Growth is sales growth. MF is the number of management earnings forecasts as 
reported in the First Call database. Volatility is the standard deviation of the firm’s 
monthly stock returns from the previous fiscal year. Beta is the CAPM beta estimated 
using monthly returns over a ten-year rolling window. News is the absolute value of the 
cumulative market-adjusted returns around the 10-K filing event window [-1, 1]. 
Complexity is the logged number of operating segments reported in Compustat. RD, 
Advertising and Positive FCF are defined as above.  
                                                          
8 I scale the standard deviation of EPS forecasts by the median forecast. An alternative is to scale the 
standard deviation by share price. However, my previous analysis shows that share prices are lower for 
firms with over-investment histories when they have positive free cash flow. Therefore, to make sure that 
the relation between the dispersion variable and M&A history is not driven by the scaling variable, I use the 
median forecast as the scalar.  
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Table 6: Information Uncertainty 
   (1)  (2)  (3) 
  FCF>=0 FCF<0 Full sample 
Incidence 0.0295** 0.00421 -0.00152 
 
(2.26) (0.12) (-0.06) 
Positive FCF 
  
-0.0644*** 
   
(-2.82) 
Incidence * Positive FCF 
  
0.0361 
   
(1.13) 
Size 0.00489 -0.00241 0.00154 
 
(1.13) (-0.20) (0.30) 
R&D 0.0264*** -0.0562*** -0.0135 
 
(3.18) (-2.95) (-1.47) 
Adv 0.0538* -0.0763 -0.00421 
 
(1.82) (-0.98) (-0.12) 
Growth -0.0997** -0.0495 -0.0677 
 
(-2.08) (-0.60) (-1.48) 
MF -0.00969*** -0.0112 -0.0109*** 
 
(-3.44) (-1.18) (-3.06) 
Volatility 0.939*** 0.487 0.726*** 
 
(6.89) (1.61) (4.88) 
News 0.565*** 0.567* 0.614*** 
 
(4.01) (1.79) (3.98) 
Complexity 0.0248** 0.0187 0.0236* 
 
(2.30) (0.55) (1.76) 
Beta 0.0113 0.0114 0.00807 
 
(0.94) (0.38) (0.59) 
Intercept Yes Yes Yes 
N 2,357 1,367 3,724 
Adjusted R-squared 0.069 0.013 0.027 
 
This table reports results from an OLS regression of analyst forecast dispersion on past history plus firm 
characteristics. The dependent variable is analyst forecast dispersion defined as the standard deviation of 
analysts’ forecasted EPS numbers dividend by the median forecasts. Incidence is weighted average negative 
performance incidence defined in the main text. Size is logged market value of equity. RD is annual research 
and development expense scaled by PPE. Adv is annual advertising expense scaled by PPE.  Growth is the 
sales growth. MF is the number of management earnings guidance as reported in the First call database. 
Volatility is the standard deviation of the firm’s monthly stock returns from the previous fiscal year. News is 
the absolute value of the cumulative market-adjusted return for the 10-K filing event window [-1, 1]. 
Complexity is the logged number of operating segments reported in Compustat. Beta is the CAPM beta 
estimated over the 10-year rolling window. Positive FCF is a dummy variable and takes one if the free cash 
flow measured as in Richardson (2006) is positive and zero otherwise. All standard errors are two-way 
clustered by both firm and year. T-statistics are presented underneath the coefficient estimates and ***, **, 
and * indicate that estimates are significantly different from zero at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 6 presents the estimation results. The coefficient estimate for Incidence is 
positive and statistically significant in the positive FCF sample and insignificantly 
different from zero at conventional significance levels in the negative FCF sample. This 
indicates that when a firm has positive free cash flow, financial analysts have more 
degree of uncertainty about future earnings for firms with histories of over-investment. 
This is consistent with the idea that analysts assign a higher likelihood of engaging in 
future acquisitions for firms with positive free cash flow. To the extent that these 
potential future acquisitions will alter a firm’s future earnings stream, and that analysts 
are more uncertain about the performance and profitability of future acquisitions for 
firms with histories of value-destroying acquisitions, analysts’ earnings forecasts will 
exhibit more dispersion. This could be due to analysts’ perception that firms with 
previous value-destroying M&As may not carefully select target firms or may not know 
how to properly integrate and manage the acquired firms. Control variables exhibit 
similar results as in Lehavy et al. (2012). To summarize, Table 6 shows that likely 
acquirers with histories of over-investment have more information uncertainty, which in 
theory would result in a higher cost of capital (Wang (1993)). Viewed together with the 
results in Table 4, these findings suggest that information uncertainty is a potential 
contributing factor to low valuations through anticipation for firms with past value-
destroying M&As.   
4.5 Effect on the announcement window return of future 
acquisitions 
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My previous analysis argues that investors assess a lower likelihood of future 
M&As for firms with negative free cash flow. An implication is that when firms with 
negative free cash flow announce M&As, the announcements are more likely to be news 
to investors. To confirm this, I study a smaller sample of firm-year observations that 
actually announced acquisitions in the future (i.e., during the long window of [-183, 183] 
where day 0 is the earnings announcement date). 9 I examine the 5-day cumulative 
abnormal return (CAR) around the acquisition announcement window [-2, +2] adjusted 
by the market model (see M&A (n+1) in Figure 1). The market model parameters are 
estimated over the long window [-210, -11] prior to the acquisition announcement. 
 Table 7, Panel A presents the descriptive statistics for the main dependent 
variable: 5-day CAR around the acquisition announcement. Consistent with results in 
Andrade et al. (2001), for the positive FCF sample, the mean of the 5-day CAR is -0.002 
and is statistically insignificant from zero (t=-0.49). The anticipation effect documented 
in the previous section provides a possible explanation for the insignificant or negative 
announcement window return. When M&As are expected, the anticipated investment 
outcomes have been impounded into stock prices prior to the announcements. When 
likely acquirers announce acquisition plans, the short-window return are no longer 
sensitive to anticipated investment outcomes as information regarding future 
investments has already found its way into prices. In contrast, the mean of 5-day CAR 
                                                          
9 I select this window to ensure that firms’ operations are known or close to known to investors. Consistent 
with the design choice in Section 3, I require announced acquisitions to be partially cash financed, i.e., the 
cash payment portion accounts for at least 1% of the transaction value. Results are similar if I alternatively 
require cash payment to be at least 5%, 10%, or 20%.   
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for the negative FCF sample is 0.012 and is marginally significant from zero (t=1.72). The 
difference is statistically significant at the 5% level (t=1.98, untabulated). This 
comparison suggests that, on average, firms with negative free cash flow experience 
higher announcement returns than firms with positive free cash flow. 10 Less anticipated 
M&A announcements contain more news to investors, resulting in higher 
announcement returns. 
 To formally examine the effect of over-investment history on the stock returns 
around future M&A announcement dates (H4), I follow the specification in Masulis et al. 
(2007) and estimate CAR as a function of firm characteristics and Incidence.  11 
CAR[-2,+2]i,t 
=α+β1Incidencei,t+β2Sizei,t+β3Leveragei,t+β4Stock price runupi,t+β5Deal valuei,t+β6Governancei,t+β7Stocki,t 
+ β8Public Targeti,t+β9Stocki,t*Public Targeti,t+ β10Private Targeti,t+β11Stock*Private Targeti,t+β12FCFi,t +u,t
 [8]
  
                                                          
10 Cai et al. (2011) also report that less anticipated bids earn significantly higher announcement returns. They 
examine how industry merger waves affect acquiring firms’ announcement returns. They define anticipated 
acquirers as bidders in industries where the previous bid was announced less than one year ago. In their 
framework, the anticipation of future acquisitions works through the information transfer through industry 
channels. In my design, the anticipation of future acquisitions works through the free cash flow hypothesis.  
11 My last hypothesis (H4) regards investors’ initial reaction to the acquisition announcement. The idea is 
that if an acquisition is expected and information about the anticipated performance implied by the past has 
already been impounded in firm value, the short-window return around the announcement should not be 
systematically related to the over-investment history. Therefore, in this test, the announcement return is not 
meant to capture the acquisition performance. In addition, the announcement return does not necessarily 
have to be complete to describe effect of the acquisition on investors’ wealth. Rather, I use this short-term 
announcement window to document investors’ pricing of an acquisition’s anticipated profitability when the 
announcement has either confirmed or updated investors’ judgment of the acquisition likelihood. As of the 
announcement date, the likelihood of an acquisition has materialized. If investors are surprised at the 
acquisition announcement, i.e., they have not formed expectation about the acquisition prior to the 
announcement, they will form expectation about the announced acquisition’s profitability based on what 
they have been observing from the firm’s investment history at the announcement window. The above 
discussion forms the basis of H4. 
.  
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Table 7: Announcement Window Return Test 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of 5-day Announcement Returns 
  FCF>=0 (Positive FCF=1)   FCF<0 (Positive FCF=0) 
Variable P25 Median P75 Std Dev Mean 
 
P25 Median P75 
Std 
Dev Mean 
CAR -0.031 -0.004 0.024 0.056 -0.002 
 
-0.029 0.011* 0.045 0.075 0.012* 
 
 (-0.73)   (-0.49)   (1.70)   (1.72) 
  
This panel reports the summary statistics of cumulative abnormal return (CAR) over the announcement 
window [-2, +2] adjusted by the market model. The market model parameters are estimated over the long 
window [-210, -11]. T-statistics (Z-statistics) for the mean (median) are presented in the parenthesis and ***, 
**, and * indicate that estimates are significantly different from zero at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Panel B: The Announcement Window Return Test  
   (1)  (2) 
  FCF>=0 FCF<0 
Incidence -0.00470 -0.0272** 
 
(-0.64) (-2.44) 
Size -0.00265* -0.00538 
 
(-1.76) (-1.11) 
Leverage 0.0284 0.00457 
 
(1.13) (0.08) 
Stock Price Runup -0.0471*** -0.0973*** 
 
(-3.18) (-3.60) 
Deal Value 0.00611 0.0463** 
 
(0.49) (2.19) 
Governance 0.00170 0.0107 
 
(0.25) (1.22) 
Stock -0.0462 0.0136 
 
(-0.83) (0.16) 
Public Target -0.0185** -0.0161 
 
(-2.53) (-1.60) 
Public Target * Stock 0.0336 -0.0683 
 
(0.60) (-0.77) 
Private Target -0.0228* -0.0249 
 
(-1.87) (-1.25) 
Private Target * 
Stock 0.0505 -0.0190 
 
(0.89) (-0.22) 
FCF 0.0480 -0.105 
 
(0.53) (-0.92) 
Intercept YES YES 
N 277 113 
Adjusted R-squared 0.076 0.324 
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This panel reports results from an OLS regression of announcement acquirer return on past history and firm 
characteristics. The dependent variable is cumulative abnormal return (CAR) over the announcement 
window [-2, +2] adjusted by the market model. The market model parameters are estimated over the long 
window [-210, -11]. Incidence is weighted average negative performance incidence defined in the main text. 
Size is the logged total assets. Leverage is market leverage defined as total debt over the sum of total debt 
and the market value of equity. Stock Price Runup is the market-adjusted buy-and-hold market-adjusted 
stock return during the long window of [-210, -11]. Deal value is the size of the deal defined as the 
transaction value divided by the acquirer’s pre-acquisition market value of equity. Governance takes one if 
the G-index from Gompers et al. (2003) is lower than the sample median and zero otherwise.  Stock takes 
one if the deal is at least partially stock-financed and zero otherwise. Public Target takes one if the target is a 
public firm and zero otherwise. Private Target takes one if the target is a private firm and zero otherwise. 
FCF is free cash flow measured as in Richardson (2006). T-statistics are presented underneath the coefficient 
estimates and ***, **, and * indicate that estimates are significantly different from zero at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively. 
The dependent variable is cumulative abnormal return (CAR). Stock Price Runup 
is the market-adjusted buy-and-hold stock return over the long window of [-210, -11] 
prior to the acquisition announcement. Deal value is the size of the deal defined as the 
transaction value divided by the acquirer’s pre-acquisition market value of equity. Stock 
takes a value of one if the deal is at least partially stock-financed and zero otherwise. 
Public Target takes a value of one if the target is a public firm and zero otherwise. Private 
Target takes a value of one if the target is a private firm and zero otherwise. Size, Leverage, 
Governance, Positive FCF are defined the same as above. Incidence is the main variable of 
interest and is hypothesized to have a negative sign for the negative FCF sample. 
 Table 7, Panel B presents the OLS regression results. Consistent with the idea 
that firms with positive free cash flow are more likely to engage in future acquisitions, 
this subsample consists of 277 firm-year observations with positive free cash flow and 
113 firm-year observations with negative free cash flow. Further, Column (1) shows that 
the coefficient estimate on Incidence is statistically insignificant from zero in the positive 
FCF sample. In contrast, in Column (2), the coefficient on Incidence is negative and 
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statistically significant (β=-0.0272, t-statistic=-2.44) in the negative FCF sample. Firms 
with the worst history suffer a drop of 3% in market value at their M&A announcements. 
Consequently, investors form expectations about the surprise announcements based on 
firms’ past M&A performance and react more negatively to firms with poorer prior 
M&A performance. On the other hand, when an acquisition announcement is 
anticipated, the anticipated profitability of future M&As has been gradually impounded 
into the share prices prior to the announcement and the announcement window return 
is not systematically associated with past M&A history. Taken together, results on the 
short-window return test around acquisition announcements are consistent with the 
anticipation effect and complement earlier findings. Conditioning on acquisitions being 
announced, stock returns are negatively associated with the history of over-investment 
for unexpected acquisitions. 
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5 Additional analysis 
5.1 Likelihood of becoming a target  
Mitchell and Lehn (1990) find that firms that made value-destroying acquisitions 
(“bad bidders”) are more likely to become takeover targets in the five years after these 
acquisitions. They explain their findings as the market taking a disciplinary role to 
promote economic efficiency by reallocating resources from value-destroying acquiring 
firms to higher-valued uses. They interpret takeovers as both a “symptom” of and a 
“solution” to the over-investment problem. Takeovers are symptoms of over-investment 
for firms that engage in value-destroying M&As. Takeovers are also solutions to over-
investment as they allow other firms to acquire the over-investing firms in the future.  
 The link between the “symptom” and the “solution”, however, is not discussed 
in their study. My findings documented in this paper suggest that the market values of 
firms with positive free cash flow and histories of over-investment in past M&As are 
lower due to investors’ expectations of future value-destroying over-investment. At the 
same time, these firms are generating positive free cash flow. These two conditions make 
them ideal takeover targets as potential acquirers can obtain control of these cash-
generating enterprises at relatively low prices. To examine if it is indeed the case that 
firms with positive free cash flow and a history of over-investment are more likely to be 
acquired, I estimate the following Logit regression.  
Acquiredi,t=α+β1Incidencei,t+ β2Sizei,t+ β3Leveragei,t+ β4BTMi,t+ β5ROAi,t+ ui,t  [9] 
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 The dependent variable takes 1 if a firm becomes a takeover target in the next 
five years. Incidence is the main variable of interest. Size, Leverage, and Positive FCF are 
defined as above. BTM is the book-to-market ratio. ROA is return on assets, defined as 
income before extraordinary items scaled by total assets. 
 Table 8:  Bad Bidders Are Taken Over 
   (1)  (2)  (3) 
  FCF>=0 FCF<0 Full Sample 
Incidence 0.922** 0.0145 0.125 
 
(2.57) (0.04) (0.32) 
Positive FCF 
  
-0.178 
   
(-0.10) 
Positive 
FCF*Incidence 
  
0.681** 
   
(2.24) 
Size -0.216** -0.0655 -0.168** 
 
(-2.43) (-0.64) (-2.21) 
Leverage 1.115 -1.555* 0.180 
 
(1.55) (-1.84) (0.26) 
BTM -0.651 0.279* -0.164 
 
(-1.49) (1.87) (-0.57) 
ROA 1.511 1.331*** 1.411 
 
(0.85) (2.99) (1.34) 
Intercept Yes Yes Yes 
N 3,853 2,365 6,218 
Pseudo R-squared 0.074 0.034 0.049 
 
This table reports results from a Logit regression of Acquired on past history and firm characteristics. The 
dependent variable Acquired takes one if a firm becomes the target in the next four years and zero 
otherwise. Incidence is weighted average negative performance incidence defined in the main text. Size is 
the logged total assets. Leverage is the market leverage defined as total debt over the sum of total debt and 
the market value of equity. BTM is the book-to-market ratio. ROA is return on assets and is defined as net 
income divided by total assets. Positive FCF is a dummy variable and takes one if the free cash flow 
measured as in Richardson (2006) is positive and zero otherwise. All standard errors are two-way clustered 
by both firm and year. Z-statistics are presented underneath the coefficient estimates and ***, **, and * 
indicate that estimates are significantly different from zero at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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     Table 8 presents the Logit regression results. Consistent with my prediction, the 
coefficient estimate on Incidence is positive and statistically significant in the subsample 
of positive FCF firms (Column (1)) and insignificant in the subsample of negative FCF 
firms (Column (2)). When estimated on the entire sample (Column (3)), the coefficient on 
Positive FCF * Incidence is positive and significant, implying that the combination of both 
positive free cash flow and a history of value-destroying acquisitions is associated with a 
higher probability of being acquired in the future. 1 These results support the argument 
in Mitchell and Lehn (1990) in that bad acquirers with positive free cash flow are more 
likely to become takeover targets. Taken together, these results suggest that the 
anticipation effect documented in the paper provides a link between the “symptom” and 
the “solution.” The combination of both the over-investment history and positive free 
cash flow gives rise to low firm values through the anticipation effect, which in turn, 
attracts outsiders to take over the bad bidders in the future.  
5.2 Further analysis using goodwill impairment 
To this point, the independent variable Incidence is measured using one-year 
post-acquisition abnormal stock returns. This measure assumes that the one-year 
abnormal return after acquisition completion captures the value consequences of 
acquisitions. To assess the sensitivity of my main results to this assumption, I also use an 
alternative accounting-based measure to evaluate past M&A investment. Specifically, I 
                                                          
1 Ai and Norton (2003) present the correct way to estimate the magnitude and standard error of the 
marginal interaction effect in nonlinear models. Untabulated results show that this interaction term is both 
positive and statistically significant. 
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use cumulative goodwill write-offs subsequent to M&As to capture whether a firm has 
over-invested in past M&As. 
Accounting rules have changed regarding goodwill impairments. In March 1995, 
the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued Statement of Financial 
Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 121, “Accounting for the Impairment of Long-Lived 
Assets,” prescribing an impairment test for long-term assets. Firms began to report 
goodwill write-offs after 1995 when SFAS No. 121 became effective. A subsequent 
standard, SFAS 142, “Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets,” effective since July 2001, 
eliminates goodwill amortization and specifies the method of computing goodwill 
impairment loss by estimating the implied fair value of goodwill as a residual asset of 
the reporting unit. When the goodwill’s expected future cash flow is lower than its book 
value, a firm writes off its goodwill. The impairment charge is reported as an expense in 
the income statement. Thus, a higher amount of goodwill write-offs indicates over-
investment in previous M&As. Therefore, I employ the cumulative goodwill write-offs 
as an alternative independent variable to capture the past history of over-investment. 2 
 As I need ten years of data to calculate past history, I repeat the analysis in Table 
4 for the post-2006 sample using this accounting-based measure. CGW (Cumulative 
Goodwill Write-off) is the sum of goodwill impairment reported in Compustat each year 
over a ten-year rolling window scaled by total assets.  If the CGW is higher, a firm is 
                                                          
2 The use of cumulative goodwill write-offs has several limitations. Recent studies (Hayn and Hughes (2006), 
Li et al. (2011)) show that managers bias the timing of goodwill impairments and that goodwill write-offs 
lag behind the economic impairment of goodwill by an average of three to four years. Muller et al. (2012) 
provide empirical evidence that corporate insiders benefit from delayed goodwill impairments through 
abnormal selling of shares.  
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more likely to have overpaid for targets in previous acquisitions. Similar to equation [4], 
I hypothesize that for firms with positive free cash flow, CGW is negatively associated 
with Tobin’s Q. 
 Table 9: Post-2006 Firm Value Test Using Goodwill Impairment 
   (1)  (2)  (3) 
  FCF>=0 FCF<0 Full sample 
CGW -0.319*** 0.0797 -0.141* 
 
(-3.73) (0.59) (-1.73) 
Positve FCF 
  
1.927*** 
   
(5.52) 
Positive FCF * CGW 
  
-7.066*** 
   
(-5.59) 
Sales -0.126 -0.354** -0.316*** 
 
(-1.27) (-2.52) (-2.74) 
Sales2 0.00984 0.0225** 0.0214*** 
 
(1.52) (2.31) (2.67) 
RD 0.0247 -0.000895 0.00539 
 
(0.60) (-0.05) (0.22) 
Advertising 0.00999 -0.00108 -0.0451 
 
(0.08) (-0.01) (-0.62) 
Capex 0.673*** 0.0639 0.478*** 
 
(3.27) (0.47) (3.03) 
Margin 1.993*** 0.151 0.515*** 
 
(6.46) (0.74) (3.13) 
Leverage -1.251*** -1.028*** -1.264*** 
 
(-5.21) (-8.72) (-6.74) 
K 0.0701 0.259*** 0.260** 
 
(0.57) (2.68) (2.43) 
K2 -0.120*** -0.0529 -0.0578 
 
(-2.98) (-1.62) (-1.64) 
Missing RD -0.0514 0.0615 0.000502 
 
(-0.81) (1.13) (0.01) 
Missing Advertising 0.0000190 0.000404 0.0000877* 
 
(0.40) (1.42) (1.82) 
Intercept Yes Yes Yes 
N 1,275 711 1,986 
Adjusted R-squared 0.310 0.244 0.265 
 
This table reports results from an OLS regression of Tobin’s Q on past cumulative goodwill write-off in 
addition to firm characteristics. Tobin’s Q is the sum of market value of equity, liquidation value of 
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preferred equity and book value of total liabilities scaled by total assets. Incidence is weighted average 
negative performance incidence defined in the main text. Sales is logged annual sales number. RD is annual 
research and development expenditure scaled by PPE. Advertising is annual advertising expense scaled by 
PPE. Capex is annual capital expenditure scaled PPE. Margin is the ratio of operating income before 
depreciation to sales. Leverage is the market leverage defined as total debt over the sum of total debt and 
the market value of equity. K is property, plant, and equipment scaled by sales. Missing RD (Missing 
Advertising) takes one if the annual RD (Advertising) is missing and zero otherwise. CGW is sum of 
goodwill write-off over the past ten years scaled by total assets. Positive FCF is a dummy variable and takes 
one if the free cash flow measured as in Richardson (2006) is positive and zero otherwise. All standard 
errors are two-way clustered by both firm and year.  T-statistics are presented underneath the coefficient 
estimates and ***, **, and * indicate that estimates are significantly different from zero at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively.  
Table 9 presents the OLS regression results using a subsample of post-2006 firm-year 
observations. As predicted, CGW is negatively and statistically significantly associated 
Tobin’s Q in the positive FCF sample, but is statistically insignificant in the negative FCF 
sample. When the regression is estimated on the full sample in Column (3), the 
interaction between Positive FCF and CGW is negative and statistically significant. These 
results confirm findings that over-investment history affects future firm value through 
the anticipation channel.  
5.3 Robustness Checks 
In this section, I provide several robustness checks to my main empirical design. 
These additional analyses help understand the main research question that I discuss in 
this paper.  
5.3.1 Use analysts’ forecasted price to calculate Tobin’s Q 
In the main analysis, I use Tobin’s Q as the proxy for firm value, whereas Tobin’s 
Q is based on the observed stock price. An alternative approach to examine investors’ 
expectations is to use analysts’ forecasted price targets. The key difference between my 
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design and the design using analysts’ forecasted price targets is whether investors, 
rather than analysts, have incorporated their anticipation of future acquisitions into the 
share price determination. In addition, the design using analysts’ forecasted price target 
sheds no direct light on whether the market is efficient in forming expectations about the 
profitability of future acquisitions. Therefore, the design using analysts’ forecasted price 
targets is indirect to the examination whether the observed market prices embed 
investors’ expectation. In this robustness check, I conduct an analysis using a subsample 
with analyst coverage. I use analysts’ forecasted price targets to calculate the expected 
Tobin’s Q and present the main result below. Expected Tobin’s Q is calculated as sum of 
expected market value of equity (the number of shares outstanding times the forecasted 
price target), liquidation value of preferred equity, and book value of total liabilities, 
scaled by the book value of total assets. Results are presented in Table 10.1. Inferences 
are very similar to the discussion for Table 4. Specifically, the coefficient on Incidence is 
negative and statistically significant only for the positive FCF sample, consistent with 
H1.  
Table 10.1: Robustness check using analysts’ forecasted price 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
Use price target 
Tobin's Q FCF>=0 FCF<0 Full sample 
Incidence -0.209*** -0.0772 -0.0425 
 
(-3.88) (-1.23) (-0.58) 
Positive FCF 
  
0.274*** 
 
  
(3.56) 
Positive FCF* Incidence 
  
-0.187* 
      (-1.93) 
Control variables  Included Included included 
N 2,586 1,206 3,792 
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Incidence is the weighted average negative performance incidence defined the same as in Table 4. Tobin’s Q 
is the expected Tobin’s Q defined as the sum of expected market value of equity (the number of shares 
outstanding times the forecasted price target), liquidation value of preferred equity, and book value of total 
liabilities, scaled by the book value of total assets. Control variables are defined similarly as in Table 4 and 
are included but not reported. T-statistics are presented underneath the coefficient estimates and ***, **, and 
* indicate that estimates are significantly different from zero at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 
5.3.2 Use alternative definitions to calculate BHCAR 
In the main analysis, I calculate BHCAR using the post-completion one-year 
stock return to classify acquisitions as value-creating or value-destroying. Alternatively, 
I calculate BHCAR from the announcement date and classify past acquisitions as value-
creating and value-destroying ones accordingly. Specifically, in the robustness check 
below, I calculate BHCAR as the one-year return compounded from the announcement 
dates of acquisitions. Results are presented in Table 10.2, Panel A and inferences are 
consistent with my main hypothesis. 
Table 10.2: Robustness check Using Alternative BHCAR definitions 
Panel A: BHCAR defined as post-announcement one-year return 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
Use BHCAR calculated as post-announcement one-year return 
Tobin's Q FCF>=0 FCF<0 Full sample 
Incidence -0.249*** -0.0677 -0.0285 
 
(-4.32) (-1.38) (-0.51) 
Positive FCF 
  
0.290*** 
   
(4.36) 
Positive FCF* Incidence 
  
-0.269*** 
      (-3.01) 
Control variables  included included Included 
N 3,853 2,365 6,218 
 
Incidence is the weighted average negative performance incidence measured using BHCAR based on post-
announcement one-year return. Control variables are defined similarly as in Table 4 and are included but 
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not reported. T-statistics are presented underneath the coefficient estimates and ***, **, and * indicate that 
estimates are significantly different from zero at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 
In the main analysis, I use one-year BHCAR after the acquisition deals to 
designate acquisitions as profitable or unprofitable. In the robustness check below, I 
present results using alternative windows to calculate BHCAR and Incidence. Specifically, 
BHCAR is defined as the compounded 6-month and 9-month return after the acquisition 
completion date, respectively. Incidence is defined similarly as before using this new 
definition of BHCAR. The variables of interest are Incidence and the positive FCF*Incidence. 
Results are presented in Table 10.2 Panel B. Across both alternative definitions of 
Incidence, the coefficient on Incidence is negative and statistically significant only on the 
positive FCF sample. When the equation is estimated over the entire sample, the 
coefficient on positive FCF *Incidence is negative and statistically significant, consistent 
with H1.  
Panel B: BHCAR defined as other alternative post-completion return 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
 
6-month BHCAR 
 
9-month BHCAR 
Tobin's Q FCF>=0 FCF<0 
Full 
sample 
  FCF>=0 FCF<0 
Full 
sample 
Incidence -0.116** -0.0786 -0.0277 
 
-0.207*** -0.0635 -0.0312 
 
(-2.30) (-1.59) (-0.53) 
 
(-3.89) (-1.29) (-0.56) 
Positive FCF 
  
0.213*** 
   
0.257*** 
   
(4.01) 
   
(4.09) 
Positive FCF* Incidence 
  
-0.141* 
   
-0.210*** 
      (-1.90)       (-2.67) 
Control variables  included included included  included included included 
N 3,853 2,365 6,218  3,853 2,365 6,218 
 
Incidence is the weighted average negative performance incidence measured using BHCAR based on post-
completion 6-month and 9-month return, respectively. Control variables are defined similarly as in Table 4 
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and are included but not reported. T-statistics are presented underneath the coefficient estimates and ***, **, 
and * indicate that estimates are significantly different from zero at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 
5.3.3 Use alternative definitions to calculate Incidence 
In the main text, I use the sign of BHCAR to classify past acquisitions into value-
creating and value-destroying ones. In other words, I use information only about the 
sign of BHCAR, and weight the sign of BHCAR to account for recency effect.  In the 
robustness check below, I utilize the actual magnitude of BHCAR and define 
IncidenceBHCAR as the negative of the weighted average of BHCAR with the weight being 
ten minus distance in time. As before, under this definition, higher Incidence maps into 
worse acquisition history.  
I first provide the summary statistics for BHCAR in Table 10.3, Panel A. The 
mean of BHCAR is negative at -0.015 and is statistically different from zero at 10% level 
(t-test). The median of BHCAR is negative at -0.056 and is statistically different from zero 
at the 1% level (Wilcoxon test). These results are very similar to a recent study by 
Erikson et al. (2012).  
I repeat the main analysis and report results based on IncidenceBHCAR in Table 10.3, 
Panel B. It is clear that, the coefficient on IncidenceBHCAR is negative and statistically 
significant only for the positive FCF (likely acquirer) sample. When the regression is 
estimated on the full sample in Column (3), the interaction between Positive FCF and 
Incidence is negative and statistically significant (β=-0.332, t-statistic=-4.08), emphasizing 
that it is the combination of both anticipated likelihood and the over-investment history 
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that matter in the firm value discount. 
As another robustness check, I use the actual magnitudes of the deals as weights. 
As opposed to using distance in time as weights in the main analysis, Columns (1) to (3) 
use the raw deal sizes as weights to account for cross-sectional differences in deal size. I 
present the results in Table 10.3, Panel C. To summarize, results are similar to the 
reported results in Table 4 in all aspects.  
 
  Table 10.3: Robustness check Using Alternative Incidence definitions  
Panel A: Summary Statistics for BHCAR  
Variable Mean P10 P25 Median P75 P90 
BHCAR -0.015* -0.512 -0.285 -0.056*** 0.162 0.454 
T-/Z-statistics  (-1.68)     (-9.10)     
 
This panel reports the summary statistics of buy-and-hold cumulative abnormal return (BHCAR) for each 
acquisition. BHCAR is defined as the one-year abnormal returns adjusted by the Fama-French (1992, 1993) 
5*5 size and book-to-market benchmark portfolios. Control variables are defined similarly as in Table 4 and 
are included but not reported. T-statistics (Z-statistics) for the mean (median) are presented in the 
parenthesis and ***, **, and * indicate that estimates are significantly different from zero at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively. 
Panel B: Results using IncidenceBHCAR 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
Incidence defined as the negative of weighted average BHCAR 
Tobin's Q FCF>=0 FCF<0 Full sample 
IncidenceBHCAR -0.315*** -0.0604 -0.0256 
 
(-5.51) (-1.28) (-0.48) 
Positive FCF 
  
0.145*** 
   
(4.47) 
Positive FCF* Incidence 
  
-0.332*** 
      (-4.08) 
Control variables  included included included 
N 3,853 2,365 6,218 
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Incidence is the weighted average negative BHCAR. Control variables are defined similarly as in Table 4 
and are included but not reported. T-statistics are presented underneath the coefficient estimates and ***, **, 
and * indicate that estimates are significantly different from zero at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
Panel C: Results using alternative weighting schemes  
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
Incidence: deal-sized weighted  
Tobin's Q FCF>=0 FCF<0 Full sample 
Incidence -0.163*** -0.0119 0.0529 
 
(-3.15) (-0.27) (1.01) 
Positive FCF 
  
0.287*** 
   
(5.48) 
Positive FCF* Incidence 
  
-0.267*** 
      (-3.42) 
Control variables  included included included 
N 3,853 2,365 6,218 
 
Incidence is the weighted average negative performance incidence defined in the main text, whereas 
weights are deal transaction values. Control variables are defined similarly as in Table 4 and are included 
but not reported. T-statistics are presented underneath the coefficient estimates and ***, **, and * indicate 
that estimates are significantly different from zero at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
5.3.4 Use alternative Definitions to Classify Acquisitions 
In my main design, I use the post-acquisition stock performance as the metric to 
assess past acquisitions’ profitability. In other words, this design uses a market-based 
measure to assess past acquisitions’ performance and then uses that as an expected 
profitability proxy to examine a market-based firm value measure, Tobin’s Q. Therefore, 
in the main examination, the dependent variable (Tobin’s Q) and the independent 
variable (Incidence) are both market-based measures, keeping the conceptual consistency 
of shareholder values. Alternatively, in this section, I employ a fundamental-based 
measure to assess past acquisitions’ profitability. Specifically, I compare the acquirer’s 
ROA in the years before and after the acquisition. If the acquirer’s shareholders 
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experience an increase (decrease) after the acquisition, that acquisition is designated as 
value-creating (value-destroying). Incidence is then defined similarly as before using this 
ROA-based measure. I present the results using this ROA-based measure in the table 
blow. 
Table 10.4: Robustness check using ROA to classify acquisition performance 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
Incidence defined based on ROA  
Tobin's Q FCF>=0 FCF<0 Full sample 
Incidence -0.131** -0.00271 -0.0162 
 
(-2.06) (-0.07) (-0.35) 
Positive FCF 
  
0.225*** 
   
(4.11) 
Positive FCF* Incidence 
  
-0.149** 
  
  
(-2.02) 
Control variables  included included included 
N 3,853 2,365 6,218 
  
Incidence is the weighted average negative performance incidence defined in the main text. An acquisition 
is classified as value-creating (value-destroying) one if the acquirer’s shareholders experience an increase 
(decrease) after the acquisition. Control variables are defined similarly as in Table 4 and are included but not 
reported. T-statistics are presented underneath the coefficient estimates and ***, **, and * indicate that 
estimates are significantly different from zero at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
The coefficient on Incidence is negative and statistically significant only for the 
positive FCF sample. When the regression is estimated on the full sample in Column (3), 
the interaction between Positive FCF and Incidence is negative and statistically significant 
at 5% level (β=-0.149, t-statistic=-2.02), emphasizing again that it is the combination of 
both anticipated likelihood and the over-investment history that matter in the firm value 
discount. 
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5.3.5 Use alternative definitions to classify likely and unlikely acquirers 
In the main analysis, I use free cash flow (FCF) to designate firms into likely 
acquirers and unlikely acquirers. This designation is consistent with Jensen’s (1986) free 
cash flow hypothesis as well as Richardson’s (2006) findings that firms with positive free 
cash flow are likely to overinvest. More importantly, firms with positive free cash flow 
have both the tendency and ability to invest in future acquisitions. Cash flows generated 
internally are less likely to subject to the monitoring of equity and debt holders and are 
more likely to be overinvested.  
An alternative way to classify firms into likely acquirers and unlikely acquirers is 
to use the predicted probability of acquisitions from equation [3]. In the following 
robustness analysis, I classify firms into likely (unlikely) acquirers using the predicted 
value from equation [3]. Specifically, the variable Likely takes a value of one (zero) if the 
predicted value from equation [3] is higher (lower) than the median. I present the results 
in Table 10.5, Panel A. In general, results are consistent with the anticipation hypothesis 
H1 and robust to the choice variable to classify firms into likely and unlikely acquirers.  
 
Table 10.5: Robustness check using alternative ways to classify likely and unlikely acquirers 
Panel A: Results using the predicted probability to classify likely and unlikely acquirers 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
Alternative way to classify acquirers 
Tobin's Q Likely=1 Likely=0 Full sample 
Incidence -0.200*** 0.0585 0.0545 
 
(-2.75) (0.56) (0.52) 
Likely 
  
0.418*** 
   
(3.43) 
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Likely* Incidence 
  
-0.288** 
      (-2.06) 
Control variables  included included Included 
N 3,853 2,365 6,218 
 
Incidence is the weighted average negative performance incidence defined the same as in Table 4. The 
variable Likely takes a value of one (zero) if the predicted value from equation [3] is higher (lower) than the 
median. Control variables are defined similarly as in Table 4 and are included but not reported. T-statistics 
are presented underneath the coefficient estimates and ***, **, and * indicate that estimates are significantly 
different from zero at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Another alternative way to classify firms into likely and unlikely acquirers is to 
use multiple-year FCF measures, following the idea that a firm with multiple years of 
positive FCF is more likely to have the financial means to make acquisitions. I first 
provide the results of an AR(1) process estimated over the entire Compustat universe as 
follows: 
FCFi,t  =  α   +   β FCFi,t-1 
              -0.006    0.603 
         (-17.12)    (38.09) 
The coefficient estimates for α and β are -0.006 and 0.603, respectively. The t-
statistics are presented in parentheses. The above result shows that free cash flow is 
time-series persistent with an AR(1) parameter of 0.603. In the following robustness 
analysis, I classify firms into likely (unlikely) acquirers using the sum of their current 
and previous year’s FCF. Specifically, the variable Positive FCF takes a value of one (zero) 
if the sum of a firm’s current and previous year FCF is positive (negative). Results are 
presented in Table 10.5, Panel B and are consistent with the anticipation hypothesis.  
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Panel B: Results using multiple-years FCF measures to classify likely and unlikely acquirer 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
FCF defined as consecutive two-year sum of FCF 
Tobin's Q FCF>=0 FCF<0 Full sample 
Incidence -0.188*** -0.00818 0.0583 
 
(-3.50) (-0.16) (1.00) 
Positive FCF 
  
0.307*** 
   
(5.03) 
Positive FCF* 
Incidence 
  
-0.301*** 
      (-3.37) 
Control variables  included included included 
N 3,853 2,365 6,218 
 
Incidence is the weighted average negative performance incidence defined the same as in Table 4. Positive 
FCF takes a value of one (zero) if the sum of a firm’s current and previous year FCF is positive (negative). 
Control variables are defined similarly as in Table 4 and are included but not reported. T-statistics are 
presented underneath the coefficient estimates and ***, **, and * indicate that estimates are significantly 
different from zero at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
5.3.6 Use alternative benchmarks to subset prior acquisitions 
In the main text, I calculate a firm’s past M&A history based on historical 
acquisitions that are at least partially cash financed, i.e., the cash payment accounts for at 
least 1% of the transaction value. This requirement enables my independent variable 
Incidence to measure how the firm spends cash in previous acquisitions. In contrast, 
acquisitions completely financed using shares are less representative about how the firm 
deals with free cash and are not employed as inputs to calculate Incidence. In the 
robustness checks below, I use alternative benchmarks to this 1% cash payment 
requirement. Specifically, I require cash payment portions larger than 5% and 10% of the 
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transaction value, respectively. Results are presented in Table 10.6 and inferences are 
similar to the discussion in the main analysis.  
Table 10.6: Robustness check using alternative benchmarks to subset prior acquisitions 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
 
Cash payment >= 5% 
 
Cash payment >=10% 
Tobin's Q FCF>=0 FCF<0 
Full 
sample 
  FCF>=0 FCF<0 
Full 
sample 
Incidence -0.180*** -0.000719 0.0656 
 
-0.193*** -0.00534 0.0563 
 
(-3.42) (-0.02) (1.18) 
 
(-3.71) (-0.11) (0.97) 
Positive FCF 
  
0.307*** 
 
  
0.310*** 
   
(5.23) 
   
(5.05) 
Positive FCF* 
Incidence 
  
-0.298***  
  
-0.306*** 
      (-3.61)       (-3.73) 
Control variables  included included included  included included included 
N 3,827 2,328 6,155  3,777 2,290 6,067 
 
Incidence is the weighted average negative performance incidence defined the same as in Table 4. Control 
variables are defined similarly as in Table 4 and are included but not reported. T-statistics are presented 
underneath the coefficient estimates and ***, **, and * indicate that estimates are significantly different from 
zero at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
5.3.7 An examination of firms making multiple acquisitions 
In the main analysis, to calculate a firm’s acquisition history, I require a firm to 
have at least one acquisition in the past ten years. In this robustness check, I include only 
firms with multiple (more than once) acquisitions in the past. I present the results in 
Table 10.7. First of all, results are generally consistent with my hypothesis that firm 
values are negatively associated with the incidence of past value-destroying M&As 
when firms have positive free cash flow. More importantly, Table 10.7 shows that on 
average, among firms with positive free cash flow, firm value decreases by 0.342 when 
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moving from firms with the best history (Incidence=0) to firms with the worst history 
(Incidence=1). In Table 4, Panel A of the main text, when I estimate the main equation on 
a sample of firms with at least one acquisition, the coefficient on Incidence is -0.179. The 
difference between the baseline sample and the multiple-acquisition sample suggests 
that the anticipation discount is more severe for firms with multiple acquisitions in the 
past. Hypothetically speaking, for two firms with identical Incidence but different times 
of acquisitions in the past, investors place a higher discount on the one with more value-
destroying acquisitions.   
Table 10.7: Results for firms with multiple acquisitions in the past 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
Multiple-acquisition sample 
Tobin's Q FCF>=0 FCF<0 Full sample 
Incidence -0.342*** -0.0207 0.0781 
 
(-3.10) (-0.15) (0.59) 
Positive FCF 
  
0.285** 
   
(2.53) 
Positive FCF* Incidence 
  
-0.450** 
      (-2.47) 
Control variables  included included included 
N 785 415 1,200 
 
Incidence is the weighted average negative performance incidence defined the same as in Table 4. Control 
variables are defined similarly as in Table 4 and are included but not reported. T-statistics are presented 
underneath the coefficient estimates and ***, **, and * indicate that estimates are significantly different from 
zero at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Taken together, these additional robustness examinations provide supporting 
evidence to my main hypothesis that investors assess an anticipation discount for firms 
with value-destroying acquisitions.  
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6  Conclusion 
I examine the long-term valuation consequence of over-investment on acquiring 
firms through the “anticipation effect,” in which forward-looking firm values contain 
information about possible upcoming M&As.  
 I find that for firms with positive free cash flow, those with the worst history of 
value-destroying M&As experience a reduction of 10% in firm value measured in 
Tobin’s Q. In contrast, firms with histories of value-destroying M&As but negative free 
cash flow do not experience significant decreases in firm values. These results are 
consistent with the idea that market valuations of firms with histories of M&A activities 
depend on both whether their past M&As are value-destroying or value-enhancing and 
whether these firms have positive free cash flow. In addition, I find that a significant 
portion of the discount is from investors’ discounting of cash holdings, consistent with 
investors expecting that cash will be invested sub-optimally when firms have engaged in 
more value-destroying M&As.  
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways by studying the economic 
consequences of acquiring firms’ past M&A activities through the anticipation channel. 
First, this paper provides evidence on the long-term implications of firms’ investment 
strategies. I show that market valuations embed information about future investments 
based on past investment outcomes through anticipation. Second, my findings shed 
light on the underlying mechanism for takeovers to function in a disciplinary role. Third, 
this paper adds empirical evidence to the literature examining the value of corporate 
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cash holdings. I show that the anticipated outcome of cash investment is directly related 
to investors’ valuation of marginal cash holdings.  
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